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This paper explores whether political factors were associated with health outcomes across 
Argentina's 23 provinces and Federal Capital from 1983 to 2005, controlling for national trends, 
per capita economic output, and other provincial specificities. The introduction of a gender quota 
for the lower house of the provincial legislature is found to have a statistically significant and 
substantively strong association with lower infant mortality. Most other political factors are 
found to be unassociated with the health share of provincial spending, attendance at birth by 
trained personnel, or infant survival. This lack of association stands in contrast to the findings of 
the cross-national literature, in which political factors are often found to be associated with 
health care spending, health service utilization, and health status. Differences in level of analysis 
(national vs. subnational) and in statistical technique help to explain these contrasting findings. 
Still, the analysis suggests that relations between political factors and health outcomes may be 
weaker than is sometimes suggested. As Amartya Sen has noted, democratic freedoms (and other 
political factors) create opportunities to improve other dimensions of human development. 
Whether these opportunities are seized depends on the actions of citizens and governments. 
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The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports.     
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1. Introduction 
  This research paper for the Human Development Report 2010 explores whether political 
factors were associated systematically with health outcomes across Argentina's 23 provinces and 
Federal Capital from 1983 to 2005, controlling for national trends, per capita economic output, 
and other provincial specificities.
1 In the human development perspective both political factors 
(e.g., political freedoms) and health outcomes (e.g., a long and healthy life) are viewed as 
intrinsic to the capability to lead a life that one values. Researchers working from a human 
development perspective are interested, however, not only in the relation of the various 
dimensions of human development to the flourishing of human capabilities, but also in the causal 
and functional relations among these dimensions. One manifestation of this interest is ongoing 
research on how the various aspects of human development (or deprivation) might be combined 
into a single index.
2  Another involves studies that explore associations among the distinct 
dimensions of human development, including political factors and health outcomes. Empirical 
research on such associations has hitherto taken place mostly at the household or cross-national 
level. It will be argued here that comparisons among subnational geographical units (provinces, 
counties, etc.) can also do much to advance the understanding of associations among dimensions 
of human development. Exploiting this underutilized level of analysis, this paper embeds a 
review of the quantitative cross-national literature on associations between political factors and 
health outcomes within an original analysis of such associations across the 24 provinces of 
Argentina in the quarter century that followed the transition from authoritarian rule in 1983.
3
                                                 
1 These 24 primary subnational units will henceforth be called provinces. 
 
2 Alkire and Santos 2010; Anand and Sen 1994; Fukuda-Parr and Shiva Kumar eds. 2005: Section 2. 
3 Appendix 1 (included below) summarizes the findings of the cross-national studies discussed in the paper, as well 
as of a few other studies not mentioned in the text.    
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  Five categories of political factors are investigated: (1) a summary index of expert ratings 
of various aspects of democracy in each province; (2) electoral participation, measured by voter 
turnout in provincial legislative elections; (3) electoral competition, measured by the winning 
party's share of legislative votes and seats and by other indicators; (4) partisanship, measured by 
whether Peronists and their allies won a plurality of provincial legislative votes and seats; and (5) 
women in politics, measured (a) by the share of provincial Chamber of Deputies seats held by 
women and (b) by the timing of the introduction of a provincial gender quota. The paper assesses 
the degree to which each of these categories of factors was associated with, respectively, health 
care spending (measured by the share of provincial public spending devoted to health care), the 
provision of basic health services (measured by the share of births attended in each province by 
trained personnel), and health status (measured by the provincial infant mortality rate). Controls 
are included for (1) overall affluence, measured by per capita residential electricity consumption; 
(2) unmeasured provincial specificities; and (3) trends affecting all provinces. Each of the 
variables is observed across the 24 provinces and across from 3 to 11 points in time. Most of the 
analyses employ panel regression techniques. 
  Compared to the political systems of other middle-income developing countries, 
Argentina's is particularly well-suited to a study of the impact at the provincial level of political 
factors on health outcomes. Argentina has been democratic since December 1983, leaving time 
for the emergence of solid time series on diverse political variables. Moreover, state agencies 
during this period have collected extensive and fairly reliable statistical information on political, 
economic, and health conditions, in some cases on an annual basis for a long succession of    
     
3 
years.
4 In addition, Argentina circa 2000 had the most decentralized political system in Latin 
America, and was tied with Brazil for the region's most decentralized health system.
5
Provinces are less heterogeneous than countries not only in terms of culture and history, 
but also in terms of the measurement of political participation and competition, public health 
care spending, health service provision, and infant mortality. Accordingly, cross-province 
analyses are in some respects less vulnerable than cross-national analyses to omitted variable 
bias and to measurement error. Social scientists have begun to highlight some of the 
contributions that the analysis of subnational units can make to the understanding of broader 
societal processes.
 To an 
unusual degree, then, provincial governments in Argentina during the period analyzed had a fair 
amount of control over health care spending, health service provision, and other factors likely to 
influence the infant mortality rate. 
6 Hundreds of national and subnational Human Development Reports have 
been published since 1990, and specialists in the politics of various Latin American countries  
have devised ways to measure political participation and competition at the provincial level.
7 
Demographers have recently estimated the infant mortality level in 2000 in 10,370 subnational 
units, mostly in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
8
                                                 
4 McGuire 2009, Web Appendix A1, reviews the quality of Argentine infant mortality data. The reference to the 
reliability of Argentine social and economic statistics pertains only to 1983-2006. In early 2007, the Kirchner 
administration made personnel changes in the National Statistical and Census Institute (INDEC). Many observers 
concluded that the agency subsequently seriously understated inflation, which in  turn distorted estimates of 
economic growth and of the income poverty headcount (Pisani 2009). 
 Economists and public health specialists have 
explored the mortality impact of social capital, income inequality, and health services across US 
states; of primary health care programs across Brazilian states; and of geographical factors across 
5  Political system decentralization rankings in Jones 2005 and Treisman 2002; health system decentralization 
rankings in Mesa-Lago 2008: 249-250. Provincial governments have been involved in health care provision since 
the late 19th century (Escudé 1976: 35-43). 
6 Snyder 2001. 
7 Beer and Mitchell 2004; Gervasoni 2009. 
8 Storeygard, Balk, Levy, and Deane 2008.    




2. Research Design 
 Despite these advances, subnational analysis remains underexploited as a 
source of information on the relations between political factors and health outcomes. 
  The units of analysis are the 24 Argentine provinces and the time period analyzed is (data 
permitting) 1983-2005. Data on infant mortality (1980-2006), gross provincial product per capita 
as measured by residential electricity consumption (1983-2004), and the health share of 
provincial public spending (1991-2004) are available year-by-year.
10 Data on the share of births 
at home and the share of births not attended by trained personnel are available for 1980, 1990, 
2000, 2004, and 2006.
11 Data on voter turnout, dispersion of votes and of legislative seats, and 
political party with the most newly-won seats in the provincial legislature are available every 
other year from 1983 to 2009.
12 Expert ratings of various aspects of democracy in Argentine 
provinces are available for the periods 1983-1987, 1995-1999, 2003-2007, and 2008.
13 The share 
of provincial legislative seats held by women has been calculated for the years 1991, 1999, 2003, 
and 2007.
14 A record has been kept of the month and year (between 1991 and 1999) in which 
each of 22 provinces introduced a gender quota for its provincial Chamber of Deputies (as of 
mid-2010 two provinces had not introduced such a quota).
15
                                                 
9 Respectively Kawachi et al. 1997 and Shi et al. 2005; Macinko et al. 2006; and Gallup, Gaviria, and Lora 2003. 
 Data are available for 1987, 1991, 
1995, 1999, 2003, and 2007 on (a) the permissiveness of each province's gubernatorial re-
election law; (b) the degree to which each province's governor has been able to anoint a 
successor; (c) the incumbent's vote share in gubernatorial elections; (d) the governing party's 
10 Infant mortality: Argentina. Ministerio de Salud 2007. GPP per capita as measured by residential electricity 
consumption: Mirabella and Nanni 2006. Health share of provincial social spending: CONES 2007. 
11 Argentina. INDEC 2009. 
12 Calculated from Tow 2010; available in the Web Appendix at http://condor.wesleyan.edu/jmcguire/Data 
13 Gervasoni 2008. 
14 Caminotti and Piscopo 2010. 
15 Lubertino 2003: 37.    
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vote share in the provincial Chamber of Deputies; and (e) the governing party's seat share in the 
provincial Chamber of Deputies.
16
Data from these sources were assembled in a set of databases, and time-series cross-




  Infant mortality and the share of births attended by trained personnel show convergence 
over time across provinces, even when transformed logarithmically. When the dependent 
variable in a time-series cross-sectional analysis exhibits convergence over time across units 
(e.g., provinces), it is necessary to include a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of 
the equation in order to obtain unbiased and consistent estimates of the coefficients of the 
regressors. The lagged dependent variable allows the researcher to "model in" the dependence of 
 To explore some of the processes behind these associations, Gross Provincial 
Product (GPP) per capita was first associated with infant mortality in the absence of political 
variables. Next, regressions were run to determine whether, after taking provincial GPP into 
account, (1) a larger share for health in provincial public spending was associated with wider 
provision of trained attendance at birth (the relation between "spending" and "services"); (2) a 
larger share for health in provincial public spending was associated with lower infant mortality 
(the relation between "spending" and "survival"); and (3) wider provision of trained attendance at 
birth was associated with lower infant mortality (the relation between "services" and "survival"). 
Exploration of these associations involving GPP per capita, public health care spending, basic 
health service provision, and infant mortality creates a baseline for the subsequent analysis of the 
impact of political factors on health outcomes. 
                                                 
16 Gervasoni 2010b. 
17 The data (.xls), Stata do-files (.do), and statistical output (.smcl) associated with the analyses reported in this paper 
are publicly available in a Web Appendix at http://condor.wesleyan.edu/jmcguire/Data.html     
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each observation on previous levels of that observation. The presence of the lagged dependent 
variable on the right-hand side, however, produces endogeneity, a non-zero correlation between 
one or more or the regressors and the error term. Because the dependent variable is dependent by 
construction on the error term, its previous values are also likely to be correlated with the error 
term. Such a correlation violates one of the assumptions that is necessary to prove that the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator is unbiased and consistent. 
  To generate unbiased and consistent parameter estimates in a time-series cross-sectional 
analysis in the presence of a regressor that is a lagged dependent variable (and in the presence of 
any other regressors that are suspected of being endogenous, i.e., correlated with the error term), 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and others have proposed a class of Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimators. These estimators use lagged levels of each independent variable, and lagged 
differences between successive observations of such variables, to instrument the variables that 
are believed to be endogenous, including the lagged dependent variable. GMM estimators have 
been shown to outperform OLS estimators in the presence of endogeneity. One such estimator, 
two-stage system GMM, is used here to check the robustness of the time-series cross-sectional 
fixed effects OLS estimates of the statistical impact of various political factors on the infant 
mortality rate. GMM should arguably also have been used to check the robustness of the OLS 
findings about the statistical impact of political factors on the share of births attended by trained 
personnel, which likewise show convergence over time across provinces. Observations of the 
share of births attended by trained personnel are available for only three years (1990, 2000, and 
2004) during the time period analyzed (1983-2005), however, and three time observations are 
insufficient to check the OLS results with the GMM estimator, which uses up one observation by 
way of the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as a regressor.    
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3. Gross Provincial Product per capita and Health Outcomes 
Most cross-national studies of the determinants of health outcomes have found that 
economic output per capita is a powerful determinant of health status as measured by such 
indicators as life expectancy and infant survival. Studies that emphasize this finding are 
sometimes characterized as making a claim that "wealthier is healthier."
18
To the extent that the narrow variant of the wealthier is healthier hypothesis accords with 
the evidence, GDP per capita should be a good predictor of the level of premature mortality at a 
given point in time ("level"), of the decline of premature mortality decline over a specific span of 
time ("progress"), and of speedups and slowdowns in the pace of premature mortality decline 
within that span of time ("tempo"). At least three mechanisms could mediate these effects. First, 
a high level or large rise of economic output per capita could create more survival-enhancing 
physical assets (e.g., roads). Second, a high level or large rise of economic output per capita 
could generate more private income, allowing households to buy more or better survival-
enhancing goods and services (e.g., food, housing, clothing, medical care) in private markets. 
  The wealthier is 
healthier conjecture comes in three variants. The narrowest variant holds that the higher the level 
(or the larger the rise) of economic output per capita, the lower the level (or the greater the 
decline) of premature mortality. In an intermediate variant, income inequality as well as GDP per 
capita is hypothesized to act as a powerful influence on health status. In a broad variant, a much 
wider class of "socioeconomic" determinants – such as GDP per capita, income inequality, ethnic 
diversity, religion, fertility, urbanization, geographical location, population density, and 
sometimes educational attainment -- is said to explain most variation in premature mortality.  
                                                 
18 Studies in this tradition include Pritchett and Summers 1996 and Filmer and Pritchett 1999.    
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Third, a high level or large rise of economic output per capita could produce more resources for 
the public financing or provision of survival-enhancing social services. 
One cross-sectional study of about 100 developing countries found that economic output 
alone explained 70 percent of the variance in infant and under-5 mortality in 1990. When six 
additional socioeconomic variables --  income inequality, fertility, urbanization, population 
density, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and a dummy variable indicating a population more 
than ninety percent Muslim -- were added to the right-hand side of the model, the proportion of 
variance explained rose to 85 percent. The level of GDP per capita also proved to be a good 
predictor of the level of infant mortality across 93 developing countries in 2005, explaining 69 
percent of the cross-national variance. Progress at raising GDP per capita was a much weaker 
predictor of progress at reducing infant mortality. The average annual percent growth of GDP 
per capita from 1960 to 2005 explained only 19 percent of the variance in the average annual 
percent decline of infant mortality across 93 developing countries from 1960 to 2005.
19
International statistical compendia, including the UNDP's Human Development Report,  
have reasonably adopted smoothing techniques to arrive at uniform and transparent estimates of 
infant mortality in developing countries.
 
20
                                                 
19 McGuire 2010: 4-5, 44. 
 Using this methodology, each annual observation of 
the infant mortality rate represents a reconciliation of alternative estimates from a variety of data 
sources (censuses, surveys, and in a few cases vital registration statistics) for several different 
years. That is not prohibitively troublesome for cross-national comparisons of infant mortality in 
the stipulated year, or even for cross-national comparisons of progress at reducing the infant 
mortality rate over an extended period of time (say, 1960 to 2005), but smoothing complicates 
20 UNICEF et al. 2007.    
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the analysis of the tempo of infant mortality decline within a country (or subnational unit) over a 
particular span of time. To depict the tempo of infant mortality decline with minimal accuracy, 
the researcher needs to draw upon the primary census, survey, and/or vital registration findings 
on the basis of which the smoothed estimates are constructed. In a study of eight middle-income 
developing countries from 1960 to 2005, close analysis of the underlying infant mortality data 
turned up numerous intervals in which slow or negative GDP per capita growth coincided with 
fast infant mortality decline,  or vice versa. In the 1970s, Argentina and Chile experienced 
negative GDP per capita growth but precipitous infant mortality decline, whereas Brazil and 
Indonesia experienced rapid GDP per capita growth but sluggish infant mortality decline.
21
Cross-nationally, then, evidence for the wealthier is healthier proposition is strongest for 
level, next strongest for progress, and weakest for tempo. An implication of this finding is that to 
focus exclusively on differences in infant mortality levels at a certain point in time, neglecting 
differences in progress at reducing infant mortality over a particular span of time, is likely to bias 
findings toward the wealthier is healthier hypothesis and the policy and institutional design 
recommendations that often accompany it. 
  
This section of the paper explores the narrow variant of the wealthier is healthier 
hypothesis, which focuses exclusively on the association between economic output per capita 
and infant mortality, across the 24 Argentine provinces in every third year from 1983 to 2005 
(i.e., in 1983, 1986, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, and 2004). The series has three-year rather 
than one-year gaps because the effect of per capita economic output on infant mortality is 
unlikely to be immediate; because most of the political factors and health outcomes studied in 
                                                 
21 McGuire 2010.     
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subsequent sections of this paper are likewise observed only 3-11 rather than 23 times; and 
because the Generalized Method of Moments estimator used to check the OLS results works 
better when the number of periods is smaller than the number of groups (in this case, provinces).  
To carry out this analysis, a first task was to decide among alternative available series for 
Gross Provincial Product (GPP) per capita. One such series covers 1961 to 2001 and is based on 
national and provincial accounts (Porto et al. 2004). Another covers 1976 to 2004 and is based 
on residential electricity consumption (Mirabella and Nanni 2006). The latter series was 
preferred because it came up to 2004 rather than only to 2001, and because estimating GPP per 
capita on the basis of residential electricity consumption rather than on the basis of national and 
provincial accounts ameliorates the problem of misleadingly high GPP per capita figures in 
provinces where oil and gas extraction plays a major role in the provincial economy.
22 Although 
GPP per capita (like GDP per capita) can be used as a proxy for overall affluence, it is actually a 
measure of economic output. Even if oil and gas extraction is less of a "curse" for human 
development than is sometimes supposed,
23
                                                 
22 Across Argentina's 24 provinces in 1998, oil and gas extraction employment as a share of total employment was 
highest in Santa Cruz (9.3 percent), Neuquén (7.7 percent), Chubut (5.6 percent), and Tierra del Fuego (3.5 percent). 
These provinces ranked 1, 2, 3, and 5 (out of 24) on the ratio of accounts to electricity GPP. The greater the weight 
of the oil and gas sector in the provincial economy, the greater the difference between GPP per capita based on 
national and provincial accounts and GPP per capita based on residential electricity consumption. When the ratio of 
accounts to electricity GPP is regressed on the ratio of oil and gas extraction employment to total employment, the 
oil and gas extraction share variable has a positive sign (the higher the share of oil and gas extraction employment, 
the higher accounts relative to electricity GPP) and is significant at better than the .001 level (t = 5.68). Employment 
figures from Argentina. MTESS 2010. Data and statistical output are in the Web Appendix. 
 it involves so much value added per worker that it is 
likely to overestimate significantly the aspects of economic output with the greatest impact on 
the infant mortality rate. Economic output measured by residential electricity consumption would 
seem to suffer less from such distortion. 
23 Pineda and Rodríguez 2010.    
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Data on provincial infant mortality rates are taken from a health ministry publication.
24 
These infant mortality figures are compiled from vital registration statistics, which are 
reasonably complete and accurate in Argentina.
25
Because the infant mortality data display convergence, OLS fixed-effects results for a 
time-series cross-sectional regression of infant mortality on GPP per capita need to be checked 
against results using instrumental variables implemented with a GMM estimator. Convergence 
means that each observation of the infant mortality rate within a given province depends on prior 
levels of infant mortality within that province. This sort of convergence has been detected in 
infant mortality time series across nations.
 Crucially, they are sufficiently complete and 
accurate to avoid the need to use smoothing techniques to reconcile disparate estimates from 
scattered years, an unavoidable practice (given the incompleteness and inaccuracy of vital 
registration statistics in most developing countries) that can nonetheless introduce substantial 
measurement error into cross-national fixed-effects time-series cross-sectional analyses in which 
infant mortality is the dependent variable. 
26  It is also evident in the provincial data for 
Argentina. The standard deviation of the natural log of the infant mortality rate across 
Argentina's 24 provinces was lower in 2006 (.25) than in 1983 (.32), indicating sigma 
convergence. The decline of the natural log of the infant mortality rate from 1983 to 2006 in the 
12 provinces with the highest 1983 infant mortality rates was .98, compared to only .75 in the 12 
provinces with the lowest 1983 infant mortality rates, indicating beta convergence.
27
                                                 
24 Argentina. Ministerio de Salud 2007. 
 
25 McGuire 2009: Web Appendix A1. 
26 Kenny 2005: 5-6. Cross-national life expectancy series also display convergence (Gray and Purser 2010: 17). 
27 The results of these analyses are available in the Web Appendix at http://condor.wesleyan.edu/jmcguire/Data.html    
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GMM is an instrumental variables method. In "difference" GMM the time-series 
observations for each province are first-differenced to remove fixed effects, and lagged levels of 
each variable are used as instruments for the differenced variables. In "system" GMM, a second 
equation is generated that uses lagged levels of each variable to instrument the level variables, 
and the results are combined with those of the first estimation in a "two-step" approach 
analogous to instrumental variables implemented through two-stage least  squares in cross-
sectional analyses. System GMM is usually more efficient than difference GMM, but it generates 
more instruments, some of which may be correlated with the error term. Hansen and Sargan tests 
can be used to check for such endogeneity; if the model passes these tests the system estimator 
should be preferred as more efficient.
28
If the number of instruments generated by the GMM estimators proliferates, bias can be 
introduced. No test exists for the proper number of instruments, but a rule of thumb is that the 
number of instruments generated should not exceed the number of groups (provinces) observed. 
To reduce the number of instruments, the researcher can limit the number of lags on the basis of 
which the instruments are constructed, and/or combine instruments. Both techniques are adopted 
here, and are implemented using the xtabond2 routine, which is downloadable for the Stata 10 
statistical package (the simpler xtabond routine, which is included in Stata 10, does not allow the 
researcher to collapse instruments; also, it allows less control over the specific lags used to 
generate the instruments).
 
29  The lags used to generate the instruments are chosen so as to 
maximize the desirability of the values obtained in the Arellano-Bond tests of first- and second-
order autocorrelation and in the Hansen and Sargan tests.
30
                                                 
28 Arellano and Bond 2001; Roodman 2006. 
 
29 Roodman 2003. 
30 Roodman 2008: 9-11.    
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As Table 2 shows, a simple pooled OLS regression of the natural log of infant mortality 
on the natural log of each measure of GPP per capita produces, as the narrow variant of the 
wealthier is healthier conjecture would predict, a strong and statistically significant negative 
coefficient (In Table 2, Model 2-1 uses electricity GPP; Model 2-5 uses accounts GPP). This 
result, however, gives full weight to cross-province as well as over-time information, and there 
may well be unobserved differences across provinces apart from their levels of overall affluence 
that affect the infant mortality rate. A fixed-effects model, which privileges the longitudinal over 
the cross-sectional information (thereby reducing the problem of omitted variable bias), produces 
no statistically significant coefficient; indeed, the sign on the coefficient is unexpectedly positive 
(Models 2-2 and 2-6). The fixed effects model does not include a regressor measuring lagged 
infant mortality, however, and the presence of convergence in the data indicates that exclusion of 
such a regressor will cause the model to suffer from omitted variable bias even in the presence of 
fixed effects. Inclusion of the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation 
ameliorates this problem, but requires the use of a GMM rather than an OLS estimator. 
Difference GMM (Models 2-3 and 2-7) does not produce a statistically significant 
coefficient on the GPP per capita variable, but the difference GMM models perform poorly on 
the Arellano-Bond tests of serial correlation, in which AR(1) should be significant at the .05 
level whereas AR(2) should be insignificant. The system GMM estimator (Models 2-4 and 2-8) 
performs better on the diagnostic tests. When GPP per capita is estimated on the basis of 
residential electricity consumption (Model 2-4), its coefficient in the system GMM analysis is 
negative, as expected (higher GPP per capita is associated with lower infant mortality), and is 
significant at better than the .01 level. When GPP per capita is estimated on the basis of 
provincial and national accounts (Model 2-8), its coefficient in the system GMM analysis is not    
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significant, possibly indicating that the accounts GPP measure is distorted (as a proxy for the 
overall affluence of people in the province) by the high value-added oil and gas extraction sector. 
In all subsequent analyses in which GPP per capita is used as a regressor, accordingly, the series 
based on residential electricity consumption (Mirabella and Nanni 2006) is used. 
The health share of provincial spending displays no unambiguous sign of convergence 
across provinces over time. Accordingly, when the dependent variable is the health share of 
provincial spending, there is relatively little to be learned by using the GMM estimator to check 
the OLS time-series cross-sectional fixed-effects estimates. Each of the two available indicators 
of the share of births attended by trained personnel does display convergence, but data on each 
indicator are available only for 1980, 1990, 2000, 2004, and 2006; and only the middle three 
observations fall into the period from 1983-2005 that is the main focus of this paper (Argentina 
transited to democracy in 1983, and data on GPP per capita are available only through 2004). 
Accordingly, when the dependent variable is an indicator of trained attendance at birth, the OLS 
time-series cross-sectional fixed-effects estimates cannot be checked against GMM estimates. 
Higher GPP per capita should be associated with a larger share for health in provincial 
public spending. The richer a province, the more its government should have available to spend 
on medical services, for which the demand is relentless.
31
                                                 
31 Newhouse 1977: 123. 
 As Table 1 reports, the data appear to 
confirm this hypothesis, although the fixed effects coefficient on GPP per capita is significant at 
only the .08 level (the pooled OLS coefficient on GPP per capita is significant at better than the 
.001 level). GPP per capita was also expected to be associated with a higher share of births 
attended by trained personnel, for reasons involving both the supply and demand side. Table 3    
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(Models 3-2 and 3-5) shows that higher GPP per capita was indeed associated with a lower share 
of births and home and a lower share of births not attended by trained personnel, although the 
coefficient on GPP per capita was significant at better than the .10 level only in the case of births 
at home. In general, however, the OLS fixed-effects estimates in the case of spending and 
services, and the GMM estimates in the case of survival, appear to be consistent with the 
hypothesis that wealthier is healthier. This conclusion provides a baseline for the examination of 
the associations among health care spending, trained attendance at birth, and infant mortality, as 
well as for the analysis of relations between political factors and health outcomes. 
4. Health Care Spending, Trained Attendance at Birth, and Infant Mortality 
  Figure 1 portrays the causal relations that are hypothesized to mediate the association 
between political factors and health outcomes. The model depicted is an extension of one 
developed by Mosley and Chen (1984), who argue that nutrition, sanitation, illness control, 
injury avoidance, and maternal characteristics (age, parity, birth spacing) comprise an exhaustive 
set of five proximate determinants of infant and child health status. More distal "socioeconomic" 
forces (affluence, education, cultural values, ecological context, governance) operate, Mosley 
and Chen argue, only through these proximate determinants. Mosley and Chen do not attempt to 
theorize the hierarchies and relations that structure the socioeconomic forces themselves, so 
Figure 1 reports a preliminary attempt to make sense of some of these hierarchies and relations 
and to signal some of the main variables that may be involved. The dotted lines in Figure 1 
depict possible reverse causation whereby survival (as a proxy for general health status), 
spending, and services could potentially influence some of the hypothesized causal variables. 
Because the time-series cross-sectional estimation method, coupled with the use of lags on the    
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independent variables in many of the models, reduces the likelihood that reverse causation is 
contributing to the obtained associations, the influences represented by the dotted lines in Figure 
1 will not be a central focus of analysis in this paper. 
  Socioeconomic forces, health care spending, and social services affect the proximate 
determinants of infant mortality rather than infant mortality itself, but cross-province data for 
Argentina are unavailable on many of the proximate determinants, so infant mortality will have 
to serve as the dependent variable. Data limitations also require the use of only a single control 
variable, economic output per capita, although the fixed-effects specification controls to some 
extent for other cross-province differences that may be affecting the infant mortality rate, while 
the use of time dummies helps to control for national trends affecting all provinces. Furthermore, 
health care spending is represented by a single indicator, the health share of provincial public 
spending; and health service provision is likewise proxied only by a pair of variables, the share 
of provincial births taking place at home and the share of provincial births not attended by 
trained personnel. Population health status is proxied only by the infant mortality rate, for which 
reasonably reliable data are available on an annual basis throughout the time period analyzed. 
  The public health hypotheses depicted in Figure 1 pertain to associations among 
spending, services, and survival. Hypothesis PH1 holds that greater public health care spending 
as a share of total public spending (or of economic output per capita) will be associated with the 
more widespread utilization of basic health services. Cross-nationally, three previous studies 
have found that greater public health care spending as a share of GDP is associated with a higher 
share of births attended by trained personnel.
32
                                                 
32 Gupta, Verhoeven, and Tiongson 2003: 692; Kruk et al. 2007; McGuire 2010: Chapter 2. Findings are mixed on 
whether the public health care share of GDP is associated with the share of infants immunized. Gauri and 
 Across the 24 provinces of Argentina, data are    
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available on the health share of provincial spending annually from 1991 to 2004, and for the 
share of births attended by trained personnel in 1990, 2000, and 2004. As Table 3 shows, using 
pooled OLS (Models 3-1 and 3-4), controlling for GPP per capita, and assuming that the health 
share of provincial spending was the same in 1990 as in 1991, the health share of provincial 
spending was associated positively (not negatively, as expected) with both the share of births at 
home and the share of births not attended by trained personnel. The coefficient lost significance 
in the fixed effects models (3-3 and 3-6), but its sign remained positive. These findings suggest 
that in Argentina from 1990 to 2004, the health share of provincial public spending had (to say 
the least) no beneficial impact on the breadth of utilization of basic health services in a province. 
  Hypothesis PH2 holds that the greater the utilization of basic social services, the lower 
the infant mortality rate. Studies in various countries have found that more widespread utilization 
of maternal and infant health care services, including oral rehydration, infant immunization, and 
complementary feeding, is associated across households with lower infant or under-5 mortality.
33
                                                                                                                                                             
Khaleghian 2002: 2119 find no effect of public health care spending as a share of GDP on immunization rates; 
McGuire 2010: Chapter 2 finds a positive effect. 
 
Across the Argentine provinces, data are available only on two indicators of basic health service 
utilization, the share of births at home and the share of births not attended by trained personnel. 
If one were forced to rely on a single class of indicators of the utilization of basic health services, 
however, one could do worse than measures of trained attendance at birth, which not only 
reduces the risk of infant death at the time of birth, but also serves as a proxy for the quality of, 
and access to, other aspects of maternal and infant health care that affect infant survival in the 
rest of the first year of life. Empirically, the share of births attended by trained personnel in 1995 
33 Bryce et al. 2003; Gauri 2002; Jones et al. 2003.    
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was correlated closely with expert ratings of maternal and child health "program effort" across 
the 47 countries that were rated on the latter variable in 1996.
34
  In the pooled OLS models both the share of births at home and the share of births not 
attended by trained personnel were associated strongly and significantly, as expected, with 
higher infant mortality (Table 4, Models 4-1 and 4-3). In the fixed effects models, however, each 
indicator was associated (insignificantly, but unexpectedly) with lower infant mortality (Table 4, 
Models 4-2 and 4-4).
 
35
  Hypothesis PH3 holds that the greater the health share of provincial public spending, the 
lower the infant mortality rate. Many studies have explored the association between spending 
and survival at the cross-national level, and although some have confirmed a positive relation, 
most have found a low or negligible association.
  These results (no statistically significant association between either 
indicator of trained attendance at birth and infant mortality) may be due to the inability of the 
OLS estimator to take into account convergence in infant mortality rates across provinces over 
time (the GMM estimator was not used because the data were insufficient to carry out the 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test for first differences, which is necessary to assess the validity of that 
estimator). More time observations are needed to produce a persuasive finding about the relation 
between services and survival (hypothesis PH2) across the 24 Argentine provinces during the 
time period analyzed. 
36
                                                 
34 Bulatao and Ross 2002; UNICEF 2004; McGuire 2006. 
 Filmer and Pritchett (1999), for example, 
35 These results were robust to forward-lagging infant mortality one year and two years ahead of trained attendance 
at birth, and also to reconstructing the infant mortality outcome as the average infant mortality rate in the three years 
after the year in which the trained attendance at birth variable is observed. In some of these experiments the sign on 
the trained attendance at birth variable became negative, as expected, but in no case did either trained attendance at 
birth variable acquire a coefficient that was statistically significant at the .10 level or better. The data and statistical 
output associated with these robustness checks are available in the Web Appendix to this paper. 
36 Przeworski et al. (2000: 239-240) found an association between more public health care spending and lower infant 
mortality; Rajkumar and Swaroop (2002) found one in countries with high-quality government institutions; and    
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found that GDP per capita, income inequality, mean years of female schooling, ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, and having a population that is more than ninety percent Muslim jointly 
explained 95 percent of the variance in infant or under-5 mortality across about 100 countries, 
both developing and industrialized, in 1990. When added to these "socioeconomic" control 
variables (modeling a broad variant of the wealthier is healthier proposition), the share of GDP 
devoted to public health care spending raised the share of the cross-national variance explained 
by less than an additional one percent.
37 One study found no significant association, controlling 
for similar socioeconomic variables, between the share of GDP devoted to public health care 
spending and infant mortality across 94 developing countries in 1990, or between ten alternative 
measures of health care spending and infant mortality across 46 poor and middle-income 
developing countries in 1996.
38 Explanations for the apparently weak cross-national association 
between spending and survival include misallocation, corruption, weak administrative capacity, 
and redundancy between public and private health care spending.
39
  Across Argentina's 24 provinces, data were available for infant mortality (the dependent 
variable), economic output per capita (a control variable), and the health share of provincial 
public spending (the independent variable of interest) on an annual basis for the years 1991 to 
2004. When infant mortality is regressed on the health share of provincial spending across the 24 
provinces over the 14 years, controlling for economic output per capita, the findings confirm the 
typical result of cross-national studies: health care spending has no significant effect on infant 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
other studies have found an association between more public health spending and mortality rates among the poor 
(Bidani and Ravallion 1997; Gupta, Verhoeven, and Tiongson 2003; Wagstaff 2003). A majority of the studies 
reviewed for this paper, however, found no association between public health care spending and mortality (Barlow 
and Vissandjée 1999; Filmer and Pritchett 1999; Kim and Moody 1992; McGuire 2006; Musgrove 1996: 44; 
Shandra et al. 2004; World Bank 2004: 37-40). 
37 Filmer and Pritchett 1999.  
38 McGuire 2006 
39 Filmer, Hammer, and Pritchett 2000; Filmer, Hammer, and Pritchett 2002; Nelson 2007.    
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mortality. These results were robust to an identical analysis measuring the variables every other 
year (resulting in 7 time observations for each province rather than 14). Using pooled OLS 
(Table 5, Model 5-1), the health share of provincial spending was unexpectedly associated with 
higher infant mortality, with a positive coefficient significant at the .10 level. Using a fixed-
effects OLS model (Table 5, Model 5-2) neither the health share of spending nor GPP per capita 
was associated significantly with infant mortality, although the coefficient on the health share of 
spending had the expected negative sign (the higher the health share, the lower infant mortality). 
Using GMM (Table 5, Model 5-3) the sign on the coefficient of the health share of provincial 
spending turned positive again (the higher the health share, the higher infant mortality), but the 
estimate fell far short of significance. Accordingly, the provincial data from Argentina provide 
no grounds for questioning the common finding of the cross-national literature that greater health 
care spending, except perhaps in some extremely poor countries, is not associated with lower 
infant mortality once overall affluence, time trends, and unit specificities are controlled for. 
5. Democracy and Health Outcomes 
  A democracy is a political regime with fair elections, basic human and civil rights, and 
policy making autonomy for elected officials. The first criterion means that political leaders must 
be chosen in fair and periodic competitive elections in which virtually all adult citizens have the 
right to vote and to stand for office. The second criterion means that citizens must be granted in 
principle, and not systematically denied in practice, basic rights like freedom from physical 
abuse by agents of the state, freedom of speech and the press, freedom of association and 
assembly, and the right to petition the government. The third criterion implies that the decisions 
of elected officials should not be vetoed or undermined systematically by unelected power-   
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holders (e.g., military leaders, local bosses, guerrilla groups, religious authorities, former heads 
of state, or foreign governments).
40
  Democracy may be vindicated instrumentally, by its beneficial consequences for some 
other human development outcome; affirmed intrinsically, as a good thing in itself (or at least as 
immediately necessary for living a good life); or justified constructively, by its role in fostering 




  Democracy could affect the utilization of publicly-funded or publicly-provided social 
services through electoral incentives, through freedom of expression, through freedom of 
association and assembly, and/or by shaping citizen expectations about the proper role for the 
state in financing or delivering social services.
  The concern of this paper is mainly with the conjecture that democracies are 
instrumentally beneficial for health outcomes. To explore and elaborate upon this conjecture, this 
section of the paper identifies mechanisms by which democracy might be expected to affect 
health outcomes. It then moves on to explore the association between democracy and health 
outcomes across the 24 Argentine provinces between 1983 and 2005. Of specific concern is 
whether a typical province, as it becomes more democratic (or at least as electoral participation 
and competition rises), will tend to (1) spend more on public health; (2) provide more 
widespread access to basic health services; and (3) have lower infant mortality.  
42
                                                 
40 These criteria for democracy are similar to those that Robert Dahl (1989: Chapter 8; 1998: 37-38, 85-86) used to 
define polyarchy, the set of institutions that is necessary, according to Dahl, to achieve the highest feasible 
attainment of the democratic process in a modern nation-state. 
  Most studies of the association between 
democracy and public service provision have focused on electoral incentives, noting that "rulers 
have the incentive to listen to what people want if they have to face their criticism and seek their 
41 Sen 1999: 148. 
42 Each of these mechanisms is explored in more detail in McGuire 2010.    
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support in elections."43  The median voter hypothesis holds that income under majority rule 
should be redistributed to those with less money to the extent that democratization (e.g., the 
extension of the franchise) pulls the income of the voter with the median income farther below 
the mean income of all of the voters.
44
  Several cross-national studies have found that more democracy is associated with greater 
health care spending, either as a share of total public spending or as a share of economic output 
(in Figure 1 this hypothesized association is labeled PS1).
  This hypothesis can be transferred from the public 
redistribution of private incomes to the public provision of social services. As democratization 
enfranchises a higher share of people inadequately served by public social services, vote-
maximizing politicians should try to improve the quality, quantity, and accessibility of such 
services. Such incentives could result in greater public spending on social services, but they 
could also produce the reallocation of such spending to uses that politicians believe will win the 
votes of the previously underserved, or improve the efficiency or effectiveness of public social 
spending. The latter mechanisms could improve access to and utilization of social services 
without higher public social spending. One might expect, then, that higher voter turnout and 
more intense electoral competition would result in a greater health share of public spending, 
more widespread public provision of basic health services, and lower infant mortality. 
45 Two such studies have also found 
that more democracy is associated with a higher share of births attended by trained personnel 
(PS2).
46
                                                 
43 Sen 1999: 152 (quotation); Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2004: 78; Lake and Baum 2001: 598. 
 A great many cross-national studies have found that more democracy is associated with 
44 Meltzer and Richard 1981. 
45 Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2004: 81; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001: 579, 582; Nooruddin and Simmons 
2004; Przeworski et al. 2000: 237; Rudra and Haggard 2005. McGuire (2010: 54, 56), however, finds a positive but 
insignificant association between democracy and public health care spending as a share of GDP. 
46 Lake and Baum (2001) and McGuire (2010: Chapter 2) find a positive association between democracy and trained 
attendance at birth.    
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a higher share of infants surviving to their first birthday (PS3).
47
  Carlos Gervasoni (2008, 2010b) has attempted to quantify aspects of democracy across 
the 24 Argentine provinces at various points in time by surveying 124 experts about the degree 
of democracy prevailing in each province during the periods from 1983 to 1987, 1995 to 1999, 
and 2003 to 2007 respectively, as well as in the year of the survey itself (2008). Each provincial 
political system was rated by a minimum of four experts. Respondents were asked to fill out a 
detailed questionnaire including more than 150 items pertaining to electoral fraud, fairness of 
media coverage, proscription of candidates, exclusion of voters, freedom of expression, judicial 
independence, capacity of the provincial legislature to check the power of the governor, religious 
discrimination, the use by provincial security forces of excessive force against protestors, and 
other indicators of democracy and authoritarianism. The responses were averaged across experts 
and aggregated into summary scores for each province, with the most democratic score possible 
set to 1.00 (which was achieved by the Federal Capital in 1995-1999, 2003-2007, and 2008 and 
by Santa Fe in 2008) and the least democratic to 5.00 (the least democratic actual score was 4.13, 
which was registered by Jujuy and by Santiago del Estero in 1995-1999). The scores for 2008 
could not be used because information on dependent variables was unavailable for so recent a 
year, but the scores for 1983-1987, 1995-1999, and 2003-2007 were used in time-series cross-
sectional models that include as regressors, respectively, the health share of provincial public 
spending, the share of provincial births at home, the share of provincial births not assisted by a 
trained attendant, and the infant mortality rate, controlling for economic output (Table 6). 
 All of these studies use expert 
ratings of democracy and all control for other factors likely to influence the outcome of interest. 
                                                 
47 Altman and Castiglioni 2009; Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno 2007; Klomp and de Haan 2009; Lake and Baum 
2001; McGuire 2010; Przeworski et al. 2000; Zweifel and Navia 2000; and Zweifel and Navia 2003 find a positive 
and statistically significant association between democracy and infant or under-5 survival; Ross 2006 and Shandra et 
al. 2004 find no such association.    
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  To interpret the findings reported in Table 6, it is important to note that Gervasoni 
assigned the highest scores on the expert rating of democracy composite index to the least 
democratic provinces. In other words, the compilation process produced a democratic deficit 
index. Accordingly, the sign of the coefficient on the democratic deficit (expert rating) index is 
expected to be (a) negative when the outcome predicted is the health share of provincial social 
spending (the higher the democratic deficit, the lower the health spending share); (b) positive 
when the outcome predicted is the share of births at home or the share of births not attended by 
trained personnel (the higher the democratic deficit, the higher the share of births at home or of 
births not attended by trained personnel); and (c) positive when the outcome predicted is the 
infant mortality rate (the higher the democratic deficit, the higher the infant mortality rate). 
  Results were generally inconsistent with these expectations. When the dependent variable 
was the health share of provincial spending, the democratic deficit variable acquired the expected 
negative coefficient, but its magnitude was small in relation to its standard error, achieving 
statistical significance at only the .17 level (Model 6-1). When the outcome was deprivation of 
trained attendance at birth, the coefficient of the democratic deficit variable was positive for one 
measure and negative for the other, with both coefficients falling far short of statistical 
significance (Models 6-2 and 6-3). Even more anomalous were the findings for infant mortality. 
Two alternative measures of the infant mortality outcome were used as a dependent variable: the 
infant mortality rate averaged over all of the years rated by the experts (1983-1987, 1995-1999, 
and 2003-2004 respectively; Model 6-4), and the infant mortality rate in the final year of each 
period (1987, 1999, and 2004 respectively; Model 6-5). Regardless of how the infant mortality 
outcome was measured, the coefficient of the democratic deficit was unexpectedly negative (the 
greater a province's democratic deficit, the lower its infant mortality rate, controlling for its GPP    
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per capita, its other idiosyncrasies, and time-related factors affecting all provinces). When infant 
mortality was measured in the final year of each period, the unexpectedly negative coefficient on 
the expert rating variable achieved statistical significance at the .05 level (Model 6-5). 
  In contrast to the findings of the cross-national literature, then, which generally found 
that more democratic countries, all else equal, had greater health spending, more widespread 
utilization of basic health services, and higher rates of infant survival, the findings of this cross-
province analysis of Argentina in the years since democratization in 1983 suggest that provinces 
with greater democratic deficits (as rated by experts) do not have significantly worse health 
outcomes. Indeed, the one significant finding was that infant mortality is unexpectedly lower in 
provinces with greater democratic deficits. One possible explanation for these findings might 
focus on the small number of time periods observed, which makes it impossible to model 
convergence. Trained attendance at birth, the dependent variable in Models 6-2 and 6-3, and 
infant mortality, the dependent variable in Models 6-4 and 6-5, show convergence across 
provinces over time, but three time observations are too few to use the GMM estimator, which 
allows convergence to be modeled by adding a lagged dependent variable as a regressor (at the 
cost of using up the first time observation for each province). Inability to model convergence is a 
big problem. As can be seen by comparing the last to the next-to-last columns of Table 1, when 
the number of observations is large enough to model convergence by substituting a GMM 
estimator for the OLS estimator, the sign of the coefficient on the independent variable of 
interest sometimes flips. Another possible explanation for the finding is, however, that 
democratic deficits really are unrelated (or are indeed related in the unexpected direction) to 
health spending, health service utilization, and health status. This possibility is addressed in the 
concluding section of the paper.    
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  Most quantitative cross-national studies of the impact of democracy on health outcomes 
have focused on the electoral aspects of democracy, particularly electoral participation and 
electoral contestation.
48 The remainder of this section of the paper will explore the statistical 
impact of voter turnout, as well as of a variety of indicators of electoral contestation, on the 
health share of provincial spending, trained attendance at birth, and infant mortality. A review of 
the quantitative literature turned up no studies that have tested for associations between voter 
turnout on the one hand, and health care spending or health service utilization on the other. Three 
studies, however, each using time-series cross-sectional regression, have explored the association 
between voter turnout and infant mortality. One did so using fixed effects across 18 Latin 
American countries from 1972 to 2001; another using random effects across 19 OECD countries 
from 1960 to 1994; and a third using fixed effects across 16 Indian states from 1970 to 2000.
49 In 
each of the studies it was hypothesized that higher voter turnout, by "making democratic 
governments responsive to a larger share of the population," would be associated, all else equal, 
with lower infant mortality (or, in the case of the Indian states study, with a sharper subsequent 
decline of infant mortality).
50 None of the studies found such an association. Indeed, the study of 
OECD countries found that higher turnout was associated with higher infant mortality.
51
  Across the 24 Argentine provinces, figures for voter turnout in provincial Chamber of 
Deputies elections are available for most provinces in most election years from 1983 to 2007. 
Voter turnout is defined as votes cast as a percentage of eligible voters (blank and invalid votes, 
 
                                                 
48 Dahl (1971) famously singled out participation and contestation as core, orthogonal dimensions of democracy. 
49 Respectively Altman and Castiglioni 2009; Chung and Muntaner 2006; and Kaza 2003. 
50 Quotation from Altman and Castiglioni 2009: 304. 
51 The relation disappeared when a control was inserted for income inequality, but the addition of that variable 
reduced the number of countries observed from 19 to 17 and the number of years observed from 35 to 3, so it is not 
clear whether the disappearance of the unexpectedly negative relation between voter turnout and infant survival was 
due to the new control variable or to the vastly reduced universe of cases (Chung and Muntaner 2006: 838).    
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which were numerous in some elections, are included in the numerator). Figures were available 
every second year in the seventeen provinces that renew their Chambers of Deputies by halves, 
and every fourth year in the seven provinces in which a single election renews the whole 
Chamber. Although Argentina, like Brazil and Mexico, has compulsory voting, it is generally 
unenforced.
52 Accordingly, voter turnout varies widely, both across provinces and over time. 
From 1983 to 2003, voter turnout in 211 elections for provincial Chamber of Deputies averaged 
79.2 percent, with a standard deviation of 5.6 percent. It was highest in Tierra del Fuego in 1983 
(90.6 percent) and lowest in Santiago del Estero in 1997 (60.0 percent).
53
  Controlling for economic output per capita, voter turnout could be related to the health 
share of provincial public spending in every second year from 1991 to 2003; to the share of 
births attended by trained personnel in 1990, 2000, and 2004; and to infant mortality in every 
second year between 1983 and 2003. In the analyses predicting spending and infant mortality, 
voter turnout is averaged over the two elections prior to the year in which the dependent variable 
is measured (i.e., 2 and 4 years prior). In the analyses predicting the proportion of mothers giving 
birth in the indicated circumstances in 1990, 2000, or 2004, voter turnout is averaged as follows: 
across the elections of 1983, 1985, 1987, and 1989 for 1990; across the elections of 1991, 1993, 
1995, 1997, and 1999 for 2000; and across the elections of 2001 and 2003 for 2004. 
 
  The results, presented in Table 7, show no evidence of any statistical relation between 
voter turnout and the health share of provincial spending (Model 7-1). Higher voter turnout is 
associated significantly, as expected, with a lower share of births not attended by trained 
personnel (Model 7-3), but also, contrary to expectations, with a higher share of births at home, 
                                                 
52 Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004: 936-937. 
53 Data are available in the Web Appendix at http://condor.wesleyan.edu/jmcguire/Data.html. The original turnout 
figures are from Tow (2010).    
     
28 
although not with a statistically significant coefficient (Model 7-2). The sign on the voter turnout 
coefficient is positive (contrary to expectations) in the OLS model predicting infant mortality 
(Model 7-4; higher turnout is associated with higher infant mortality), but negative (in line with 
expectations) in the GMM model (Model 7-5; higher turnout is associated with lower infant 
mortality). Neither estimator, however, produces a statistically significant coefficient on voter 
turnout. Accordingly, confirming the findings of the cross-national (and cross-provincial) 
analyses summarized above, voter turnout lacked a robust association with health outcomes 
across Argentina's 24 provinces from 1983 to 2003. Perhaps voter turnout does not vary enough 
to influence legislators' decisions about which way to vote on health-related issues. 
Alternatively, high voter turnout may not really hold legislators more accountable to the public. 
Another possibility is that high voter turnout does hold legislators more accountable to the 
public, but that the public is indifferent (or even in some cases opposed) to raising the share of 
health spending, to providing more widespread access to trained attendance at birth, or to doing 
what is needed to accelerate the decline of the infant mortality rate. 
  The competitiveness of elections might also be expected to influence health outcomes. 
The more competitive the election, one might conjecture, the greater the incentive to legislators, 
in the interest of fending off challengers, to raise the share of health care in provincial social 
spending, to introduce or improve primary health care programs designed to deliver trained 
attendance at birth to the underserved, or to undertake other actions likely to reduce the infant 
mortality rate. The literature reviewed for this paper included only one study that explored the 
association between electoral competitiveness and a health outcome. This study found that, 
across 16 Indian states observed every fifth year from 1970 to 2000, electoral competitiveness 
(measured as the share of seats won in the state legislature by the most-voted party minus the    
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share of seats won by the second most-voted party) was an insignificant predictor of infant 
mortality decline over the subsequent five-year period.
54
  In the analysis of Argentine provinces, four indicators of competitiveness were devised, 
two involving the dispersion of votes and two involving the dispersion of seats in elections to the 
provincial Chamber of Deputies. The Chamber serves as a unicameral provincial legislature in 
sixteen provinces (including the Federal Capital) and as the lower house of a bicameral 
provincial legislature in the remaining eight. The dispersion of votes was measured alternatively 
as the vote share of the most-voted party or coalition ("vote share") and as the ratio of the vote 
share of the most-voted party or coalition to the vote share of the second most-voted party or 
coalition ("vote gap"). The dispersion of seats was measured as the share of seats won by the 
most-voted party or coalition ("seat share") and as the ratio of the share of seats won by the 
most-voted party or coalition to the share of seats won by the second most-voted party or 
coalition ("seat gap"). Higher scores on each variable are interpreted to mean a less competitive 
Chamber of Deputies election. As with voter turnout, the data were calculated from figures 
provided by Tow (2010), and the competitiveness observations were lagged analogously to the 
voter turnout observations. The results of analyses associating vote share, vote gap, seat share, 
and seat gap respectively with the health share of provincial spending, non-attendance at birth by 
trained personnel, and infant mortality are summarized in Table 1 and detailed in Tables 8-11. 
 
  Carlos Gervasoni (2010a) has compiled for 22 of the 24 Argentine provinces in 1987, 
1991, 1995, 1999, and 2003 alternative measures of provincial electoral competition and of 
power concentration in an incumbent provincial governor. Gervasoni classifies as indicators of 
                                                 
54 Kaza 2003: 19, 33-38.    
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electoral competition (1) the share of the gubernatorial vote won by the party of the governor 
and (2) the share of the legislative vote won by the party of the governor. He classifies as 
indicators of power concentration in the incumbent (3) the share of legislative seats won by the 
party of the incumbent governor, (4) the permissiveness of the province's re-election law, and (5) 
the ability of the incumbent governor actually to anoint a successor. Variables (1), (2), and (3) 
range continuously from 0 to 100; each is expressed as a percentage of votes or seats won in the 
indicated year's election. Variables (4) and (5) are ordinal. The permissiveness of a province's 
gubernatorial re-election law is coded 0 if the law forbids immediate re-election; 1 if it allows 
only one immediate re-election; 2 if it allows two immediate re-elections; and 3 if it allows 
unlimited immediate re-elections. The ability of the incumbent governor actually to anoint a 
successor is coded 0 if an opposition candidate succeeds the incumbent; 1 if the successor is a 
co-partisan who is not a family member or close ally of the incumbent; 2 if the successor is a 
family member or close ally of the incumbent; and 3 if the incumbent is re-elected. 
  As scaled in the present analysis (although not in Gervasoni's original data), a higher 
score on each of the five variables means either a less competitive election or more power 
concentration in an incumbent --  which can itself lead to a less competitive election. For 
convenience, then, the five indicators conceptualized and operationalized by Gervasoni, along 
with the four compiled directly from data in Tow (2010) (vote share, vote gap, seat share, and 
seat gap in provincial Chamber of Deputies elections), will henceforth be referred to collectively 
as indicators of electoral non-competitiveness. The higher the score on such an indicator, the 
lower the ability of the electorate to hold incumbents accountable for improving the provision of    
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public goods, as opposed to sponsoring pork-barrel projects or delivering private payoffs.
55
  In the event, none of the nine electoral non-competitiveness variables were related 
significantly, as expected, to a lower health share of provincial spending, although seven of the 
nine had coefficients whose signs pointed in the expected negative direction (Table 1), and two 
of these seven negative coefficients were significant at the .11 and .13 levels respectively (seat 
gap in Model 11-1; incumbent share of gubernatorial vote in Model 14-1). None of the nine 
electoral non-competitiveness variables were related significantly to a higher share of births not 
attended by trained personnel, and seven of the nine were associated, unexpectedly, with a 
significantly lower share of births at home (Table 1 and Tables 8-16). Only the seat share of the 
most-voted party (Model 10-4) and the permissiveness of the gubernatorial re-election law 
(Model 12-4) were associated with the infant mortality rate in the expected positive direction and 
at the .10 level or better. In the former case, but not in the latter, the GMM estimate weakly 
confirmed the OLS estimate (Models 10-5 and 12-5).  In short, evidence that electoral non-
competitiveness was associated with worse health outcomes in the data set analyzed was weak in 
the cases of spending and survival and non-existent in the case of services. The only coefficients 
 
Accordingly, more electoral non-competitiveness should be associated with a lower share for 
health care in provincial public spending, more non-attendance at birth by trained personnel, and 
higher infant mortality. If this expectation is met, the signs on the coefficients in the last five 
columns of Table 1 in the rows with the electoral non-competiveness variables (corresponding to 
Tables 8-16 inclusive) should be negative and significant for the health share of public spending, 
positive and significant for the share of births at home and for the share of births not attended by 
trained personnel, and positive and significant for infant mortality. 
                                                 
55 Lizzeri and Persico (2001) and Diaz-Cayeros (2010) produce findings consistent with this logic.    
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that proved to be significant at the .05 level or better pointed in the unexpected direction (more 
electoral non-competiveness was associated with a lower share of births at home). This finding 
may be due to the conservative statistical techniques employed (fixed effects, robust standard 
errors), but it could also mean that changes in the competitiveness of provincial legislative and 
gubernatorial elections did not affect the evolution of health care spending, trained attendance at 
birth, or infant mortality within each of Argentina's 24 provinces from 1983 to 2005. 
6. Partisanship, Women in Politics, and Health Outcomes 
  Cross-national analysis has been used to explore the role of partisanship and ideology in 
shaping health outcomes. One might expect that left-leaning governments, as compared to right-
leaning governments, would be associated with higher public health spending, more widespread 
utilization of basic social services (e.g., trained attendance at birth), and lower infant mortality. 
Research findings for developing countries are at odds with this conjecture, however. One time-
series cross-sectional study of 14 Latin American countries observed annually from 1973 to 1997 
found that when "popularly based governments" (including the Peronists in Argentina) were in 
power, public health and education spending grew more slowly, rather than faster as expected.
56 
Similarly, a cross-sectional analysis of 120 countries circa 1970 found that left governments had 
no significant positive association with the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), and that right 
governments were actually associated, controlling for other relevant variables, with a higher 
score on the PQLI (provided that government spending was low).
57
                                                 
56 Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001. The authors note that this finding is inconsistent with some studies of rich 
countries, in which left governments appear to spend more on health and education. 
 
57 Moon 1991.    
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  Across the 24 provinces of Argentina, partisanship/ideology was measured simply by a 
dummy variable representing whether the party winning the most seats in the provincial 
legislature was (1) or was not (0) linked to the Peronist movement. This variable proved to have 
no significant statistical association with the health share of provincial public spending, with 
trained attendance at birth, or with infant mortality (Table 17). This lack of an association 
between Peronist electoral strength and better health outcomes is not surprising. For one thing, 
Peronism has remarkable ideological and programmatic flexibility. It is never a good idea to try 
to predict what a Peronist-dominated legislature will do if one's only information is that the 
legislature is dominated by Peronists. Second, Peronism has strong ties to an urban formal-sector 
coalition that includes that includes many owners, managers, civil servants, professionals, 
university faculty and students, union leaders, and regularly-employed workers whose interests 
are not always the same as those of the very poor and destitute.
58
  Argentina in 1991 became the first Latin American country to implement a law reserving 
for women a stipulated proportion of the slots (33 percent in the Argentine case) on a party's list 
of candidates for national legislative seats. Two years later, an executive decree strengthened the 
law by requiring the reserved slots for women to be in "electable" positions (preventing party 
leaders from placing all of the women at the bottom of the list where they would be unlikely to 
win a seat). Since the passage of this law, many provinces have also adopted gender quotas for 
their own provincial legislatures.
  
59
                                                 
58 McGuire 1997; McGuire 1999; McGuire 2010. 
 A certain amount of evidence suggests that a rise in women's 
political participation is associated with greater health care spending and with lower infant and 
child mortality. A study of the 50 US states from 1900 to 1936 using trend-break analysis found 
59 Jones 1998.    
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that the passage of a female suffrage law was associated with a rise in public spending on health 
care and on charities and hospitals; with a decline of overall mortality rates; and with a decline of 
mortality rates from specific diseases.
60 A time-series cross-sectional analysis of 16 Indian states 
observed in every fifth year from 1970 to 2000 found using fixed effects that the share of 
legislative seats held by women was associated with steeper infant mortality decline over the 
subsequent five-year period, controlling for other relevant factors.
61
  Across the 24 Argentine provinces, the share of provincial legislative seats occupied by 
women in 1991, 1999, and 2003 respectively was not associated significantly two years later 
either with a higher share for health care in provincial public spending, with a higher share of 
births attended by trained personnel, or with a lower infant mortality rate (Table 18). Consistent 
with the study of the 50 US states, however, a trend-break analysis finds that the timing of the 
introduction of a gender quota in an Argentine province between 1992 and 1999 was associated 
with a statistically significant and substantively large decline of the infant mortality rate (Table 
19). Across the 24 provinces (unweighted by population), the average infant mortality rate in 
1991, the year before provincial gender quota laws began to go into effect, was 25.0 per 1000. 
Multiplying through, the coefficient on the gender quota dummy variable in Model 19-5 (.075) 
means that, had a provincial gender quota been in effect in each province in 1991, the average 
infant mortality rate would have been 19.6 rather than 25.0 per 1000, about 20 percent lower.
 
62
                                                 
60 Miller 2008. 
 
Replication of the OLS fixed effects analysis with the GMM estimator turned up no significant 
association between the timing of the implementation of a gender quota and a lower infant 
mortality rate, but the GMM estimator uses lags of the levels and differences of the independent 
61 Kaza 2003. 
62 The data and calculations are available in the Web Appendix for this paper.    
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variables to instrument for the present values of those variables, a procedure that would seem to 
be senseless when the regressor of interest is a 0/1 dummy variable. Accordingly, accepting the 
OLS fixed effects results, the strongest finding in the whole analysis is that the introduction of a 
law requiring party lists competing for seats in elections to provincial Chamber of Deputies to 
include a set proportion of women (30-50 percent) in electable positions had a statistically 
significant and substantively important association with a lower provincial infant mortality rate. 
7. Summary and Implications 
  In addition to this finding about the gender quota, what stands out from this analysis is 
the weakness and fragility of associations between political factors and health outcomes across 
the 24 provinces of Argentina from 1983 to 2005. This result is at odds with much of the cross-
national literature, which has tended to find a positive association between democracy (however 
measured) on the one hand and health outcomes (spending, services, and survival) on the other. 
  Several factors may help to account for the discrepancy between the findings of cross-
national studies and the findings of this cross-province study. First, variation on both the 
independent variables (e.g., voter turnout) and dependent variables (e.g., infant mortality) tends 
to be greater across countries than across provinces, and the findings of many cross-national 
studies reflect this greater cross-unit variation. Second, this analysis uses province fixed effects. 
Accordingly, its estimates are produced mainly on the basis of the information that comes from 
changes over time within provinces, and only secondarily (in the sense that there are 24 time 
series from which to extract information) from differences across provinces. Much of the cross-
country literature uses random effects or other statistical techniques (e.g., pooled OLS), in which 
parameter estimates are made on the basis of cross-unit as well as within-unit variation. The    
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statistical techniques used in this paper, notably fixed effects and heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors, are thus more conservative than those used in some cross-national studies. 
  A more substantive reason why most political factors were associated only weakly (if at 
all) with health outcomes across the 24 Argentine provinces from 1983 to 2005 may have to do 
with national-level public health policies. Although provincial governments in Argentina have 
considerable leeway over the allocation of public expenditure, national-level policies sometimes 
overshadow province-level policies in influencing health service utilization and population 
health status. In October 2004, for example, the Ministry of Health, in collaboration with the 
World Bank, introduced the Plan Nacer (Birth Plan) in an effort to improve the health status of 
uninsured people in nine impoverished northwestern and northeastern provinces. Participants in 
the Plan Nacer were entitled to receive, free of charge, a package of 80 basic health interventions 
(checkups, medications, obstetric services, etc.).
63 The coverage of the Plan Nacer expanded 
rapidly, from 40,000 beneficiaries in January 2005 to 450,000 in June 2007.
64  In the nine 
provinces in which the Plan Nacer was initially implemented, infant mortality fell from 18.7 per 
1000 in 2004 to 14.2 per 1000 in 2006 (24 percent), whereas in the fifteen provinces that the Plan 
had not yet reached, infant mortality fell only from 12.2 to 11.3 per 1000 (8 percent).
65
                                                 
63 World Bank 2006: 10-11, 17. 
 If the 
Plan Nacer had raised trained attendance at birth and reduced infant mortality about equally in 
each of the nine provinces that initially received it, each of the nine provinces would have shown 
64 World Bank 2006: 84; World Bank 2007: 27. The 450,000 entrolled in the Plan Nacer in June 2007 made up 65 
percent of the eligible population in the nine provinces initially targeted. The estimated cost of the Plan Nacer was 
US $10 per beneficiary per month (World Bank 2006: 17). 
65 Calculated from absolute numbers of registered births and infant deaths aggregated across the 9 and 15 provinces 
in 2000 (Argentina. Ministerio de Salud 2001: Table 22, p. 61); 2003 (Argentina. Ministerio de Salud 2004: Table 
29, p. 67); 2004 (Argentina. Ministerio de Salud 2005: Table 31, p. 69); and 2006 (Argentina. Ministerio de Salud 
2007: Table 32, p. 77). From 2000 to 2003, by contrast, before the plan was implemented, the rate had barely 
budged in either set of provinces From 2000 to 2003, infant mortality fell only from 21.9 to 21.1 in the nine 
provinces that would get the Plan Nacer in its initial stage, and from 14.3 to 14.2 in the other 15 provinces.    
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a similar percentage decline in infant mortality, which would tend to obscure any association 
between within-province changes in political circumstances and infant mortality. Year dummies 
were included in all models to help account for multi-province interventions like the Plan Nacer, 
but would not fully pick up the statistical impact of a program that is implemented in one year in 
nine provinces and in a subsequent year in the remaining fifteen. 
  Other substantive factors may also help to explain why fluctuations in voter turnout and 
in electoral competitiveness had unexpectedly weak associations with health outcomes across the 
Argentine provinces analyzed here. The expectation of a stronger association comes principally 
from the median voter hypothesis described in the third paragraph of Section 5. As Keefer and 
Khemani (2005) have noted, however, some of the assumptions of the median voter hypothesis 
may not hold in developing countries. In many such countries, Keefer and Khemani point out, 
voters lack information about incumbent performance; doubt that challengers can deliver what 
they have promised; and/or prefer to vote according to religious, regional, or ethnic identity 
rather than on the basis of a candidate's perceived capacity to deliver basic services.66
  It might be added, moreover, that even when voters (in any country) do cast their ballots 
on the basis of policy preferences, the policies they prefer will not necessarily be conducive to 
rapid mortality decline. For example, voters in rich and poor countries alike tend to demand 
curative services excessively and preventive services insufficiently, so politicians who seek their 
support may well enact policies that are not optimal for mortality decline. A preoccupation with 
curative at the expense of preventive health services could help to explain why democratization 
is sometimes found to be associated with a decline of immunization coverage.
 
67
                                                 
66 Keefer and Khemani 2005; see also World Bank 2004: 81-85. 
 In the United 
67 Gauri and Khaleghian 2002: 2124-2125.    
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States, the legalization of some currently illegal drugs (by reducing opportunities for criminal 
enterprise) and the more effective enforcement of traffic laws (by means of automated cameras, 
for example) would likely lead to substantial reductions in deaths due to violence and traffic 
accidents respectively. Such reforms conflict with other widely-held values, however, and vote-
seeking politicians do not seem to be stumbling over one another to advocate them. 
  As Amartya Sen has written, "democracy does not serve as an automatic remedy of 
ailments as quinine works to remedy malaria. The opportunity it opens up has to be positively 
grabbed in order to achieve the desired effect." Democracy creates opportunities; leaders and 
citizens have to take advantage of them.
68
                                                 
68 Sen 1999: 147-158, quotation from 155. 
  Only by recognizing that democracy does not 
automatically provide the benefits expected of it, and by identifying critical points at which 
breakdowns occur, can leaders and citizens empower themselves to improve its quality.  
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Figure 1: Model Guiding the Quantitative Analysis 
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Table 1: Summary of Main Statistical Findings 
  Table  Periods 
(Nº Obs.) 
















Method        TSCS    
Fixed 
Effects 
TSCS    
Fixed 
Effects 
TSCS     
Fixed 
Effects 






GPP (by resid. elec. 
consumption), ln.  
Not 
shown 




.032†                 
(1.86) 
       
GPP (by resid. elec. 
consumption), ln.  
5  4  1980, 1990, 
2000, 2004 
  -1.256†        
(1.87) 
-1.073         
(1.17) 
   
GPP (by resid. elec. 
consumption), ln.  
2  8         
(93) 
Every 3º yr 
1983-2004 
      .049                
(0.42) 
-.248**            
(3.11) 
Health share of 
provincial spending 




  2.890           
(0.72) 
4.511           
(0.81) 
   








% births not attend. 
by trained pers., ln 








Health share of 
provincial spending 




      -.086      
(0.15) 
.956        
(1.01) 
Expert rating of 
democracy 




-.006   
(1.42) 
.108   
(0.71) 






Voter turnout as % 
eligible voters 
7  3-9     
(65-215) 
See T. 7  .00003           
(0.08) 
.042             
(1.01) 
-.119*             
(2.24) 
.004               
(0.80) 
-.009              
(1.01) 
Vote share for most-
voted party 
8  3-9     
(64-215) 
See T. 8  -.002              
(0.95) 
-.026*           
(2.65) 
-.018              
(0.85) 
-.001                
(0.46) 
.001               
(0.50) 
Vote gap between 2 
most-voted parties 
9  3-9     
(64-215) 
See T. 9  .00011           
(0.34) 
-.390*          
(2.19) 
.197                
(0.66) 
-.001              
(0.04) 
-.135              
(1.00) 
Seat share for most-
voted party 
10  3-9     
(63-198) 
See T. 10  -.010             
(0.53) 
-1.44†            
(1.80) 
-1.234            
(1.01) 
.201†              
(1.73) 
.209               
(1.53) 
Seat gap between 2 
most-voted parties 
11  3-9     
(63-198) 
See T. 11  -.002               
(1.67) 
-.163*            
(2.49) 
-.076             
(0.59) 
.015              
(1.44) 
.018              
(1.44) 
Permissiveness of 
gov. re-election law 
12  3-9     
(63-198) 
See T. 12  .005               
(1.46) 
.046              
(0.47) 
.102              
(0.85) 
.803†               
(1.83) 
-.004              
(0.18) 
Governor's ability to 
control successor 
13  3-5    
(67-116) 
See T. 13  -.002              
(0.99) 
-.052              
(0.74) 
.075              
(0.62) 
.001              
(0.00) 
.064              
(0.82) 
Share of gov. vote to 
incumbent party 
14  3-9     
(61-102) 
See T. 14  -.0003              
(1.56) 
-.014              
(2.55)* 
.006              
(0.50) 
-.005              
(0.18) 
-.005              
(0.84) 
Share of leg. vote to 
incumbent party 
15  3-9     
(61-102) 
See T. 15  -.0002              
(0.84) 
-.019              
(2.87)* 
-.008              
(0.89) 
-.023              
(0.62) 
-.005              
(0.71) 
Share of leg. seats to 
incumbent party 
16  3-9     
(61-102) 
See T. 16  -.0002              
(0.84) 
-.019              
(2.87)* 
-.008              
(0.89) 
-.023              
(0.62) 
.569              
(1.01) 
Peronists win most 
votes for prov legis. 
17  3-9     
(64-215) 
See T. 17  -.002               
(0.77) 
.585         
(1.04) 
-.736            
(1.53) 
.022             
(0.69) 
-.069            
(0.52) 
Women as % 
provincial deputies 




.000    
(0.05) 
-.012   
(1.11) 






Gender quota (0 
before, 1 after) 




-.004      
(1.28) 
    -.075*** 
(4.73) 
-.001      
(0.05) 
Boldface: P ≤ .10, signed in the expected direction 
Boldface, italics: P ≤ .10, signed in the unexpected direction 
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Table 2: Gross Provincial Product per capita and Infant Mortality 
 
   2-1   2-2  2-3  2-4  2-5  2-6  2-7  2-8 






















































every 3rd year 
1983-2006 
Max. Nº years observed  8  8  6  7  7  7  5  6 
Avg. Nº years observed  7.9  7.9  5.92  6.92  6.9  6.9  4.92  5.92 
Nº Provinces  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24 
Nº Observations  190  190  142  166  166  166  118  142 
Method  Pooled OLS  TSCS FE  Two-Step Diff 
GMM 
Two-Step Sys  
GMM 




Infant mortality rate lagged one 
period (three years) 
    .736                
(1.05) 
.859***   
(4.02) 
    .182                
(0.63) 
1.145***   
(7.18) 
GPP/cap by resident. electricity 
cnsmp., ln (Mirabella and Nanni 
2006), every 3rd year 1983-2004 
-.559***        
(12.03) 
.049                
(0.42) 
-.079            
(0.15) 
-.248**            
(3.11) 
       
GPP/cap by national and 
provincial accts., ln (Porto et al. 
2004), every 3rd year 1983-2001 
        -.292***        
(9.31) 
.072                
(0.89) 
.229                
(0.85) 
.199                
(0.92) 
R-sq (R-sq within for FE)  .6859  .8196      .6622  .7945     
P > F  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000 
Lag limits      (5 3)  (4 3)      (5 3)  (4 4) 
Instrument set collapsed?      Yes  Yes      Yes  Yes 
Nº Instruments      12  13      11  10 
AR(1) (P > z)      .370  .047      .515  .050 
AR(2) (P > z)      .466  .473      .132  .207 
Hansen test (P > X
2)      .733  .686      .606  .412 
Diff Hansen: GMM, Dif (P > X
2)      .  .652        .412 
Sargan test (P > X
2)      .312  .377      .363  .700 
 
Top row in each cell: unstandardized regression coefficient. Bottom row (in parentheses): absolute value of t-statistic. Significance: †10%; *5%; **1%; ***0.1%. All two-tailed. 
All models include a constant (not shown; in difference GMM the constant is eliminated by differencing) and time dummies (not shown) for 1983, 1986, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 
2001, and 2004 respectively (except that there is no GPP per capita observation for 2004 in the Porto et al. series). In the OLS and fixed effects models, heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are used. In the two-step GMM models, Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors are used (Roodman 2006: 9-11). Lag limits in GMM models are chosen 
to come as close as possible to generating significant AR(1) P-values, insignificant AR(2) p-values, and Sargan and Hansen statistics whose P-values are greater than .25 but do not 
approach 1.00 (Roodman 2008: 11, 18; Petreski 2009: 16; Efendic, Pugh, and Adnett 2010: 13-14).  
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Table 3: Health Share of Provincial Spending and Trained Attendance at Birth 
 
   3-1   3-2  3-3  3-4  3-5  3-6 
Dependent variable  Share of births at 
home (INDEC 
2009), ln, in 
1980, 1990, 
2000, and 2004 
Share of births at 
home (INDEC 
2009), ln, in 
1980, 1990, 
2000, and 2004 
Share of births at 
home (INDEC 
2009), ln, in 
1980, 1990, 
2000, and 2004 
Share of births 
not attended by 
trained personnel 
(INDEC 2009), 
ln, in 1980, 1990, 
2000, and 2004 
Share of births 
not attended by 
trained personnel 
(INDEC 2009), 
ln, in 1980, 1990, 
2000, and 2004 
Share of births 
not attended by 
trained personnel 
(INDEC 2009), 
ln, in 1980, 1990, 
2000, and 2004 
Maximum number of years observed  4  4  4  4  4  4 
Average number of years observed  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0 
Nº Provinces  24  24  24  24  24  24 
Nº Observations  96  96  96  96  96  96 
Method  Pooled OLS  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  Pooled OLS  TSCS FE  TSCS FE 
Gross provincial product per capita, ln (Mirabella 
and Nanni 2006), 1983, 1990, 2001, 2004 
-4.110***   
(10.76) 
-1.256†        
(1.87) 
-1.272†        
(1.78) 
-4.730***   
(12.32) 
-1.073         
(1.17) 
-1.099         
(1.13) 
Health share of provincial spending (1980: Porto 
et al. 2004; 1991, 2000, 2004: CONES 2009), 
11.921**        
(2.74) 
  2.890           
(0.72) 
12.220*        
(2.36) 
  4.511           
(0.81) 
R-sq (R-sq within for FE)  .5936  .8121  .8156  .5959  .6662  .6727 
P > F  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000 
 
Top row in each cell: unstandardized regression coefficient. Bottom row (in parentheses): absolute value of t-statistic. Significance: †10%; *5%; **1%; ***0.1%. All two-tailed. 
All models include a constant (not shown) and time dummies (not shown) for 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2004 respectively. All models use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.  
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Table 4: Trained Attendance at Birth and Infant Mortality 
 
     4-1   4-2  4-3  4-4 




Salud 2007) in 
1980, 1990, 





Salud 2007) in 
1980, 1990, 





Salud 2007) in 
1980, 1990, 





Salud 2007) in 
1980, 1990, 
2000, and 2004 
  Maximum number of years observed  4  4  4  4 
  Average number of years observed  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0 
  Nº Provinces  24  24  24  24 
  Nº Observations  96  96  96  96 
  Method  Pooled OLS  TSCS FE  Pooled OLS  TSCS FE 
  Gross provincial product per capita, ln (Mirabella 
and Nanni 2006), 1983, 1990, 2000, 2004 
-.285*       
(2.20) 
-.097        
(0.53) 
-.389**    
(2.82) 
-.078        
(0.46) 
  Share of births at home (INDEC 2009), ln, in 
1980, 1990, 2000, and 2004 
.155***        
(5.37) 
-.035        
(0.63) 
   
  Share of births not attended by trained personnel 
(INDEC 2009), ln, in 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2004 
    .107***   
(5.00) 
-.022        
(0.80) 
  R-sq (R-sq within for FE)  .5651  .8744  .5065  .8743 
  P > F  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000 
 
Top row in each cell: unstandardized regression coefficient. Bottom row (in parentheses): absolute value of t-statistic. Significance: †10%; *5%; **1%; ***0.1%. All two-tailed. 
All models include a constant (not shown) and time dummies (not shown) for 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2004. All models use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The results in 
Table 4 are robust to forward-lagging infant mortality one year and two years ahead of trained attendance at birth, and also to reconstructing the infant mortality outcome as the 
average infant mortality rate in the three years after the year in which the trained attendance at birth variable is observed. In some of the experiments the sign on the trained 
attendance at birth variable became negative, as expected, but in no case did either trained attendance at birth variable acquire a coefficient that was statistically significant at the 
.10 level or better.   
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Table 5: Health Share of Provincial Public Spending and Infant Mortality 
 
     5-1   5-2   5-3 


















  Maximum number of years observed  14  14  13 
  Average number of years observed  14.0  14.0  13.0 
  Nº Provinces  24  24  24 
  Nº Observations  336  336  312 
  Method  Pooled OLS  TSCS FE  Two-Step Sys  
GMM 
  Infant mortality rate lagged one period (one 
year) 
    .813***       
(4.55) 
  Gross provincial product per capita, ln 
(Mirabella and Nanni 2006), 1991-2004 
-.635***  
(11.11) 
-.031       
(0.22) 
-.279†      
(1.83) 
  Health share of provincial spending (CONES 
2009), 1991-2004 
.678†        
(1.77) 
-.086       
(0.15) 
.956        
(1.01) 
  R-square (R-square within for FE)  .3628  .6826   
  P > F  .0000  .0000  .0000 
  Lag limits      (3 2) 
  Instrument set collapsed?      Yes 
  Nº Instruments      22 
  AR(1) (P > z)      .007 
  AR(2) (P > z)      .751 
  Hansen test (P > X
2)      .388 
  Diff-in-Hansen (GMM, Diff.) (P > X
2)      ..682 
  Sargan test (P > X
2)      .304 
 
Top row in each cell: unstandardized regression coefficient. Bottom row (in parentheses): absolute value of t-statistic. Significance: †10%; *5%; **1%; ***0.1%. All two-tailed. 
All models include a constant (not shown) and time dummies (not shown). In the pooled OLS and fixed effects models, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used. In the 
two-step GMM model, Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors are used (Roodman 2006: 9-11). Lag limits in GMM models are chosen to come as close as possible to 
generating significant AR(1) P-values, insignificant AR(2) p-values, and Sargan and Hansen statistics whose P-values are greater than .25 but do not approach 1.00 (Roodman 
2008: 11, 18; Petreski 2009: 16; Efendic, Pugh, and Adnett 2010: 13-14). Results are robust to substituting the natural log for the absolute level of the health share of provincial 
social spending; lagging the spending variable one period, alternative lag limits in the GMM model, and limiting observations to every other year from 1992 to 2004 inclusive (7 
periods).  
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Table 6: Democratic Deficit (As Rated By Experts) and Health Outcomes 
 
  6-1  6-2  6-3  6-4  6-5 
Dependent 
variable 
Health share of 
provincial spending 
(CONES 2009), 
level at end of 
democracy rating 
period 
Share of births at 
home, ln (INDEC 
2009) in 1990, 
2000, and 2004 
Share of births not 
attended by trained 
personnel, ln 
(INDEC 2009) in 
1990, 2000, and 
2004 
Infant mortality, ln 
(Argentina. 




Infant mortality, ln 
(Argentina. 
Ministerio de Salud 
2007), level at end 
of democracy 
rating period 
Maximum number of periods observed  3  3  3  3  3 
Average number of periods observed  3.0  2.9  2.8  3.0  3.0 
Nº Provinces  24  24  24  24  24 
Nº Observations  71  70  68  71  71 
Method  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE 
Gross provincial product per capita, ln 
(Mirabella and Nanni 2006), average for 











Democratic deficit (expert rating) (Gervasoni 











R-squared (within)  .2800  .6946  .5943  .9415  .8928 
p > F  .0371    .0000    .0000    .0000    .0000 
 
Top row in each cell: unstandardized regression coefficient. Bottom row (in parentheses): absolute value of t-statistic. Significance: †10%; *5%; **1%; ***0.1%. All two-tailed. 
All models include a constant (not shown) and time dummies (not shown) for the three periods, 1983-1987, 1995-1999, and 2003-2004. All models use heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors.  
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Table 7: Voter Turnout and Health Outcomes 
 
     7-1  7-2  7-3  7-4  7-5 




every 2 years 
1991-2004 
Share of births 
at home, ln 
(INDEC 2009) 
in 1990, 2000, 
and 2004 
Share of births not 
attended by trained 
personnel, ln 
(INDEC 2009) in 












every 2 years 
1983-2004 
  Maximum number of years observed  7  3  3  9  9 
  Average number of years observed  7.0  2.8  2.7  9.0  8.9 
  Nº Provinces  24  24  24  24  24 
  Nº Observations  167  67  65  215  214 
  Method  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  Two-Step Sys  
GMM 
  Infant mortality rate lagged one period (two 
years) 
        .482               
(1.58) 
  Gross provincial product per capita, ln 
(Mirabella and Nanni 2006), 1983-2004 
.036*              
(2.07) 
-2.708*              
(2.14) 
-.934               
(0.78) 
.069              
(0.64) 
-.130              
(0.33) 
  Voter turnout as a percent of eligible voters 
(Tow 2010), 1983-2003 
.00003           
(0.08) 
.042             
(1.01) 
-.119*             
(2.24) 
.004               
(0.80) 
-.009              
(1.01) 
  R-squared "within" (fixed effects are used)  .1804  .4604  .4541  .8044   
  P > F  .0070  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000 
  Lag limits for GMM model (xtabond2)          (5 4) 
  Instrument set collapsed in GMM Model?          Yes 
  Nº Instruments in GMM model          18 
  AR(1) (P > z)          .021 
  AR(2) (P > z)          .797 
  Hansen test (P > X
2)          .428 
  Diff-in-Hansen (GMM, Diff.) (P > X
2)          .329 
  Sargan test (P > X
2)          .010 
 
Top row in each cell: unstandardized regression coefficient. Bottom row (in parentheses): absolute value of t-statistic. Significance: †10%; *5%; **1%; ***0.1%. All two-tailed. 
All models include a constant (not shown) and time dummies (not shown). In the fixed effects models, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used. In the two-step GMM 
model, Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors are used (Roodman 2006: 9-11). Lag limits in the GMM model are chosen to come as close as possible to generating 
significant AR(1) P-values, insignificant AR(2) p-values, and Sargan and Hansen statistics whose P-values are greater than .25 but do not approach 1.00 (Roodman 2008: 11, 18; 
Petreski 2009: 16; Efendic, Pugh, and Adnett 2010: 13-14). In the analyses predicting spending and infant mortality, voter turnout is averaged over the two elections prior to the 
year in which the dependent variable is measured (i.e., 2 and 4 years prior). In the analyses predicting the proportion of mothers giving birth in the indicated circumstances in 1990, 
2000, or 2004, voter turnout is averaged as follows: across the elections of 1983, 1985, 1987, and 1989 for 1990; across the elections of 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, and 1999 for 
2000; and across the elections of 2001 and 2003 for 2004.  
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Table 8: Vote Share for Most-Voted Party and Health Outcomes 
    8-1  8-2  8-3  8-4  8-5 
     Health share of 
provincial 
spending (CONES 
2009), every 2 
years 1991-2004 
Share of births at 
home, ln (INDEC 
2009) in 1990, 
2000, and 2004 
Share of births not 
attended by trained 
personnel, ln 
(INDEC 2009) in 





every 2 years 
1983-2004 
Infant mortality, ln 
(Argentina. 
Ministerio de 
Salud 2007), every 
2 years 1983-2004 
  Maximum number of years observed  7  3  3  9  9 
  Average number of years observed  7.0  2.8  2.7  9.0  8.9 
  Nº Provinces  24  24  24  24  24 
  Nº Observations  167  66  64  215  214 
  Method  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  Two-Step Sys  
GMM 
  Infant mortality rate lagged one period (two 
years) 
        .483*             
(2.16) 
  Gross provincial product per capita, ln 
(Mirabella and Nanni 2006), 1983-2004 
.036*              
(2.08) 
-2.574*              
(2.16) 
-.1.121              
(1.12) 
.060              
(0.55) 
-.239              
(0.69) 
  Vote share for most-voted party in provincial 
Chamber (Tow 2010), 1983-2003 
-.002              
(0.95) 
-.026*           
(2.65) 
-.018               
(0.85) 
-.001                
(0.46) 
.001               
(0.50) 
  R-squared "within" (fixed effects are used)  .1881  .4778  .4353  .8065   
  P > F  .0087  .0000  .0006  .0000  .0000 
  Lag limits for GMM model (xtabond2)          (3 2) 
  Instrument set collapsed in GMM Model?          Yes 
  Nº Instruments in GMM model          18 
  AR(1) (P > z)          .005 
  AR(2) (P > z)          .679 
  Hansen test (P > X
2)          .527 
  Diff-in-Hansen (GMM, Diff.) (P > X
2)          .511 
  Sargan test (P > X
2)          .000 
 
Top row in each cell: unstandardized regression coefficient. Bottom row (in parentheses): absolute value of t-statistic. Significance: †10%; *5%; **1%; ***0.1%. All two-tailed. 
All models include a constant (not shown) and time dummies (not shown). In the fixed effects models, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used. In the two-step GMM 
model, Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors are used (Roodman 2006: 9-11). Lag limits in GMM models are chosen to come as close as possible to generating 
significant AR(1) P-values, insignificant AR(2) p-values, and Sargan and Hansen statistics whose P-values are greater than .25 but do not approach 1.00 (Roodman 2008: 11, 18; 
Petreski 2009: 16; Efendic, Pugh, and Adnett 2010: 13-14). In the analyses predicting spending and infant mortality, the vote share is averaged over the two elections prior to the 
year in which the dependent variable is measured (i.e., 2 and 4 years prior). In the analyses predicting the proportion of mothers giving birth in the indicated circumstances in 1990, 
2000, or 2004, vote share for the most-voted party or coalition is averaged as follows: across the elections of 1983, 1985, 1987, and 1989 for 1990; across the elections of 1991, 
1993, 1995, 1997, and 1999 for 2000; and across the elections of 2001 and 2003 for 2004.  
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Table 9: Vote Gap Between Most- and Next Most-Voted Party and Health Outcomes 
 
    9-1  9-2  9-3  9-4  9-5 
  Dependent variable  Health share of 
provincial 
spending (CONES 
2009), every 2 
years 1991-2004 
Share of births 
at home, ln 
(INDEC 2009) 
in 1990, 2000, 
and 2004 
Share of births not 
attended by trained 
personnel, ln 
(INDEC 2009) in 





every 2 years 
1983-2004 
Infant mortality, ln 
(Argentina. 
Ministerio de 
Salud 2007), every 
2 years 1983-2004 
  Maximum number of years observed  7  3  3  9  9 
  Average number of years observed  7.0  2.8  2.7  9.0  8.9 
  Nº Provinces  24  24  24  24  24 
  Nº Observations  167  66  64  215  214 
  Method  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  Two-Step Sys  
GMM 
  Infant mortality rate lagged one period (two 
years) 
        .799†             
(1.79) 
  Gross provincial product per capita, ln 
(Mirabella and Nanni 2006), 1983-2004 
.035*              
(2.14) 
-2.236†              
(1.89) 
-1.153              
(1.11) 
.066              
(0.60) 
.066              
(0.07) 
  Vote gap between 1º & 2º most-voted party in 
provincial Chamber (Tow 2010), 1983-2003 
.00011           
(0.34) 
-.390*          
(2.19) 
.197                
(0.66) 
-.001              
(0.04) 
-.135              
(1.00) 
  R-squared "within" (fixed effects are used)  .1823  .4859  .4324  .8030   
  P > F  .0096  .0000  .0021  .0000  .0000 
  Lag limits          (5 4) 
  Instrument set collapsed?          Yes 
  Nº Instruments          18 
  AR(1) (P > z)          .043 
  AR(2) (P > z)          .797 
  Hansen test (P > X
2)          .493 
  Diff-in-Hansen (GMM, Diff.) (P > X
2)          .172 
  Sargan test (P > X
2)          .556 
 
Top row in each cell: unstandardized regression coefficient. Bottom row (in parentheses): absolute value of t-statistic. Significance: †10%; *5%; **1%; ***0.1%. All two-tailed. 
All models include a constant (not shown) and time dummies (not shown). In the fixed effects models, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used. In the two-step GMM 
model, Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors are used (Roodman 2006: 9-11). Lag limits in the GMM model are chosen to come as close as possible to generating 
significant AR(1) P-values, insignificant AR(2) p-values, and Sargan and Hansen statistics whose P-values are greater than .25 but do not approach 1.00 (Roodman 2008: 11, 18; 
Petreski 2009: 16; Efendic, Pugh, and Adnett 2010: 13-14). In the analyses predicting spending and infant mortality, the vote gap between the most-voted and the next most-voted 
party (or coalition) is averaged over the two elections prior to the year in which the dependent variable is measured (2 and 4 years prior). In the analyses predicting the proportion 
of mothers giving birth in the indicated circumstances in 1990, 2000, or 2004, the vote gap between the most-voted and the next most-voted party is averaged as follows: across the 
elections of 1983, 1985, 1987, and 1989 for 1990; across the elections of 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, and 1999 for 2000; and across the elections of 2001 and 2003 for 2004.  
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Table 10: Seat Share for Most-Voted Party and Health Outcomes 
 
     10-1  10-2   10-3  10-4  10-5 
  Dependent variable  Health share of 
provincial 
spending (CONES 
2009), every 2 
years 1991-2004 
Share of births at 
home, ln (INDEC 
2009) in 1990, 
2000, and 2004 
Share of births not 
attended by 
trained personnel, 
ln (INDEC 2009) 
in 1990, 2000, 
2004 
Infant mortality, ln 
(Argentina. 
Ministerio de 
Salud 2007), every 
2 years 1983-2004 
Infant mortality, ln 
(Argentina. 
Ministerio de 
Salud 2007), every 
2 years 1983-2004 
  Maximum number of years observed  7  3  3  9  9 
  Average number of years observed  6.7  2.7  2.7  8.6  8.6 
  Nº Provinces  23  23  23  23  23 
  Nº Observations  153  63  61  198  197 
  Method  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  Two-Step Sys  
GMM 
  lagged dependent variable          .658**          
(3.17) 
  Gross provincial product per capita, ln 
(Mirabella and Nanni 2006), 1983-2004 
.028              
(1.59) 
-2.672*              
(2.18) 
-.827              
(0.88) 
.066              
(0.57) 
.048              
(0.17) 
  Seat share for the most-voted party in 
provincial  Chamber (Tow 2010), 1983-2003 
-.010             
(0.53) 
-1.442†            
(1.80) 
-1.234            
(1.01) 
.201†             
(1.73) 
.209               
(1.53) 
  R-squared "within" (fixed effects are used)  .1667  .4486  .3990  .8054   
  P > F  .0093  .0000  .0019  .0000  .0000 
  Lag limits          (3 2) 
  Instrument set collapsed?          Yes 
  Nº Instruments          18 
  AR(1) (P > z)          .005 
  AR(2) (P > z)          .679 
  Hansen test (P > X
2)          .527 
  Diff-in-Hansen (GMM, Diff.) (P > X
2)          .511 
  Sargan test (P > X
2)          .000 
 
Top row in each cell: unstandardized regression coefficient. Bottom row (in parentheses): absolute value of t-statistic. Significance: †10%; *5%; **1%; ***0.1%. All two-tailed. 
All models include a constant (not shown) and time dummies (not shown). In the fixed effects models, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used. In the two-step GMM 
model, Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors are used (Roodman 2006: 9-11). Lag limits in the GMM model are chosen to come as close as possible to generating 
significant AR(1) P-values, insignificant AR(2) p-values, and Sargan and Hansen statistics whose P-values are greater than .25 but do not approach 1.00 (Roodman 2008: 11, 18; 
Petreski 2009: 16; Efendic, Pugh, and Adnett 2010: 13-14). In the analyses predicting spending and infant mortality, the seat share is averaged over the two elections prior to the 
year in which the dependent variable is measured (i.e., 2 and 4 years prior). In the analyses predicting the proportion of mothers giving birth in the indicated circumstances in 1990, 
2000, or 2004, the seat share is averaged as follows: across the elections of 1983, 1985, 1987, and 1989 for 1990; across the elections of 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, and 1999 for 
2000; and across the elections of 2001 and 2003 for 2004. All analyses exclude the province of La Rioja, which has an unsually high score on the seat gap variable.  
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Table 11: Seat Gap Between Most- and Next Most-Voted Party and Health Outcomes 
     11-1  11-2   11-3  11-4  11-5 
  Dependent variable  Health share of 
provincial 
spending (CONES 
2009), every 2 
years 1991-2004 
Share of births at 
home, ln (INDEC 
2009) in 1990, 
2000, and 2004 
Share of births not 
attended by 
trained personnel, 
ln (INDEC 2009) 
in 1990, 2000, 
2004 
Infant mortality, ln 
(Argentina. 
Ministerio de 
Salud 2007), every 
2 years 1983-2004 
Infant mortality, ln 
(Argentina. 
Ministerio de 
Salud 2007), every 
2 years 1983-2004 
  Maximum number of years observed  7  3  3  9  9 
  Average number of years observed  6.7  2.7  2.7  8.6  8.6 
  Nº Provinces  23  23  23  23  23 
  Nº Observations  153  63  61  198  197 
  Method  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  Two-Step Sys  
GMM 
  Infant mortality rate lagged one period (two 
years) 
        .567**            
(1.79) 
  Gross provincial product per capita, ln 
(Mirabella and Nanni 2006), 1983-2004 
.027                
(1.55) 
-2.574*              
(2.09) 
-.634              
(0.67) 
.078              
(0.65) 
.074              
(0.30) 
  Seat gap between 1º & 2º most-voted party in 
provincial Chamber (Tow 2010), 1983-2003 
-.002               
(1.67) 
-.163*            
(2.49) 
-.076             
(0.59) 
.015              
(1.44) 
.018              
(1.44) 
  R-squared "within" (fixed effects are used)  .1747  .4513  .3908  .8035   
  P > F  .0037  .0000  .0045  .0000  .0000 
  Lag limits          (3 2) 
  Instrument set collapsed?          Yes 
  Nº Instruments          18 
  AR(1) (P > z)          .006 
  AR(2) (P > z)          .684 
  Hansen test (P > X
2)          .771 
  Diff-in-Hansen (GMM, Diff.) (P > X
2)          .879 
  Sargan test (P > X
2)          .130 
 
Top row in each cell: unstandardized regression coefficient. Bottom row (in parentheses): absolute value of t-statistic. Significance: †10%; *5%; **1%; ***0.1%. All two-tailed. 
All models include a constant (not shown) and time dummies (not shown). In the fixed effects models, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used. In the two-step GMM 
model, Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors are used (Roodman 2006: 9-11). Lag limits in the GMM model are chosen to come as close as possible to generating 
significant AR(1) P-values, insignificant AR(2) p-values, and Sargan and Hansen statistics whose P-values are greater than .25 but do not approach 1.00 (Roodman 2008: 11, 18; 
Petreski 2009: 16; Efendic, Pugh, and Adnett 2010: 13-14). In the analyses predicting spending and infant mortality, the seat gap between the most-voted and the next most-voted 
party (or coalition) is averaged over the two elections prior to the year in which the dependent variable is measured (2 and 4 years prior). In the analyses predicting the proportion 
of mothers giving birth in the indicated circumstances in 1990, 2000, or 2004, the seat gap between the most-voted and the next most-voted party is averaged as follows: across the 
elections of 1983, 1985, 1987, and 1989 for 1990; across the elections of 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, and 1999 for 2000; and across the elections of 2001 and 2003 for 2004. All 
analyses exclude the province of La Rioja, which has an unsually high score on the seat gap variable.  
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Table 12: Re-Election Law for Provincial Governor and Health Outcomes 
   12-1  12-2   12-3  12-4  12-5 




in 1993, 1997, 
2001, and 2004 
Share of births at 
home, ln (INDEC 
2009) in 1990, 
2000, and 2004 
Share of births not 
attended by 
trained personnel, 
ln (INDEC 2009) 
in 1990, 2000, 
2004 
Infant mortality, ln 
(Argentina. 
Ministerio de 
Salud 2007) in 
1989, 1993, 1997, 
2001, and 2005 
Infant mortality, ln 
(Argentina. 
Ministerio de 
Salud 2007) in 
1989, 1993, 1997, 
2001, and 2005 
Maximum number of years observed  4  3  3  5  4 
Average number of years observed  3.9  2.9  2.9  4.8  3.9 
Nº Provinces  24  24  23  24  24 
Nº Observations  94  69  67  116  94 
Method  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  Two-Step Sys  
GMM 
Infant mortality rate lagged one period (four years)          1.106*            
(2.36) 
Gross provincial product per capita, ln (Mirabella and 
Nanni 2006) 
.029                
(1.51) 
-1.751*              
(2.34) 
-1.395              
(1.41) 
-.502              
(0.20) 
.044              
(0.17) 
Did provincial constitution permit 0, 1, 2, or ∞ (coded "3") 
immediate re-elections (Gervasoni 2010b)? 
.005               
(1.46) 
.046              
(0.47) 
.102              
(0.85) 
.803†              
(1.83) 
-.004              
(0.18) 
R-squared "within" (fixed effects are used)  .1614  .7353  .5931  .8543   
P > F  .2715  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000 
Lag limits          (3 3) 
Instrument set collapsed?          No 
Nº Instruments          11 
AR(1) (P > z)          .021 
AR(2) (P > z)          .150 
Hansen test (P > X
2)          .326 
Diff-in-Hansen (GMM, Diff.) (P > X
2)          .205 
Sargan test (P > X
2)          .435 
 
Top row in each cell: unstandardized regression coefficient. Bottom row (in parentheses): absolute value of t-statistic. Significance: †10%; *5%; **1%; ***0.1%. All two-tailed. 
All models include a constant (not shown) and time dummies (not shown). In the fixed effects models, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used. In the two-step GMM 
model, Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors are used (Roodman 2006: 9-11). Lag limits in the GMM model are chosen to come as close as possible to generating 
significant AR(1) P-values, insignificant AR(2) p-values, and Sargan and Hansen statistics whose P-values are greater than .25 but do not approach 1.00 (Roodman 2008: 11, 18; 
Petreski 2009: 16; Efendic, Pugh, and Adnett 2010: 13-14). The re-election law is measured in 1991, 1995, 1999, and 2003 in the analyses predicting spending; in 1987, 1999, and 
2003 in the analyses predicting birth circumstances; and in 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, and 2003 in the analyses predicting infant mortality (the lagged dependent variable in the 
GMM model requires the exclusion of observations for 1987). In the GMM analysis the constitutional re-election law is treated as an exogenous variable. Gervasoni's (2010b) data 
were supplemented by other sources as detailed in the data set available in the Web Appendix at http://condor.wesleyan.edu/jmcguire/Data.html.  
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Table 13: Incumbent Control of Succession to Governorship and Health Outcomes 
 
   13-1  13-2   13-3  13-4  13-5 




in 1993, 1997, 
2001, and 2004 
Share of births at 
home, ln (INDEC 
2009) in 1990, 
2000, and 2004 
Share of births not 
attended by 
trained personnel, 
ln (INDEC 2009) 
in 1990, 2000, 
2004 
Infant mortality, ln 
(Argentina. 
Ministerio de 
Salud 2007) in 
1989, 1993, 1997, 
2001, and 2005 
Infant mortality, ln 
(Argentina. 
Ministerio de 
Salud 2007) in 
1989, 1993, 1997, 
2001, and 2005 
Maximum number of years observed  4  3  3  5  4 
Average number of years observed  3.7      2.8      2.8  4.6  3.9 
Nº Provinces  22  22  22  22  22 
Nº Observations  81  61  61  102  94 
Method  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  Two-Step Sys  
GMM 
Infant mortality rate lagged one period (four years)          1.127**            
(2.36) 
Gross provincial product per capita, ln (Mirabella and 
Nanni 2006) 
.030                
(1.49) 
-2.126**              
(2.34) 
-1.373              
(1.12) 
-.634              
(0.24) 
.394              
(0.90) 
Succession control: victory by opposition = 0, co-partisan = 
1, close ally = 2, re-election = 3 (Gervasoni 2010b) 
-.002              
(0.99) 
-.052              
(0.74) 
.075              
(0.62) 
.001              
(0.00) 
.064              
(0.82) 
R-squared "within" (fixed effects are used)  .1498  .7687  .5948  .8383   
P > F  .3592  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000 
Lag limits          (3 3) 
Instrument set collapsed?          No 
Nº Instruments          14 
AR(1) (P > z)          .045 
AR(2) (P > z)          .887 
Hansen test (P > X
2)          .268 
Diff-in-Hansen (GMM, Diff.) (P > X
2)          .243 
Sargan test (P > X
2)          .390 
 
Top row in each cell: unstandardized regression coefficient. Bottom row (in parentheses): absolute value of t-statistic. Significance: †10%; *5%; **1%; ***0.1%. All two-tailed. 
All models include a constant (not shown) and time dummies (not shown). In the fixed effects models, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used. In the two-step GMM 
model, Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors are used (Roodman 2006: 9-11). Lag limits in the GMM model are chosen to come as close as possible to generating 
significant AR(1) P-values, insignificant AR(2) p-values, and Sargan and Hansen statistics whose P-values are greater than .25 but do not approach 1.00 (Roodman 2008: 11, 18; 
Petreski 2009: 16; Efendic, Pugh, and Adnett 2010: 13-14). Incumbent control of succession is measured in 1991, 1995, 1999, and 2003 in the analyses predicting spending; in 
1987, 1999, and 2003 in the analyses predicting birth circumstances; and in 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, and 2003 in the analyses predicting infant mortality (the lagged dependent 
variable in the GMM model requires the exclusion of observations for 1987). In the GMM analysis incumbent control of succession is treated as an endogenous variable. 
Gervasoni (2010b) provided no coding for the Federal Capital or for Tierra del Fuego.  
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Table 14: Share of Gubernatorial Vote Won By Incumbent Party and Health Outcomes 
 
   14-1  14-2   14-3  14-4  14-5 




in 1993, 1997, 
2001, and 2004 
Share of births at 
home, ln (INDEC 
2009) in 1990, 
2000, and 2004 
Share of births not 
attended by 
trained personnel, 
ln (INDEC 2009) 
in 1990, 2000, 
2004 
Infant mortality, ln 
(Argentina. 
Ministerio de 
Salud 2007) in 
1989, 1993, 1997, 
2001, and 2005 
Infant mortality, ln 
(Argentina. 
Ministerio de 
Salud 2007) in 
1989, 1993, 1997, 
2001, and 2005 
Maximum number of years observed  4  3  3  5  4 
Average number of years observed  3.7      2.8      2.8  4.6  3.9 
Nº Provinces  22  22  22  22  22 
Nº Observations  81  61  61  102  94 
Method  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  Two-Step Sys  
GMM 
Infant mortality rate lagged one period (four years)          1.253***            
(4.16) 
Gross provincial product per capita, ln (Mirabella and 
Nanni 2006) 
.027                
(1.30) 
-2.055**              
(2.34) 
-1.367              
(1.14) 
-.650              
(0.25) 
.370              
(0.89) 
Share of gubernatorial vote won by the incumbent party or 
coalition (Gervasoni 2010b) 
-.0003              
(1.56) 
-.014              
(2.55)* 
.006              
(0.50) 
-.005              
(0.18) 
-.005              
(0.84) 
R-squared "within" (fixed effects are used)  .1498  .7843  .5945  .8384   
P > F  .3592  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000 
Lag limits          (3 .) 
Instrument set collapsed?          Yes 
Nº Instruments          12 
AR(1) (P > z)          .014 
AR(2) (P > z)          .582 
Hansen test (P > X
2)          .631 
Diff-in-Hansen (GMM, Diff.) (P > X
2)          .783 
Sargan test (P > X
2)          .712 
 
Top row in each cell: unstandardized regression coefficient. Bottom row (in parentheses): absolute value of t-statistic. Significance: †10%; *5%; **1%; ***0.1%. All two-tailed. 
All models include a constant (not shown) and time dummies (not shown). In the fixed effects models, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used. In the two-step GMM 
model, Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors are used (Roodman 2006: 9-11). Lag limits in the GMM model are chosen to come as close as possible to generating 
significant AR(1) P-values, insignificant AR(2) p-values, and Sargan and Hansen statistics whose P-values are greater than .25 but do not approach 1.00 (Roodman 2008: 11, 18; 
Petreski 2009: 16; Efendic, Pugh, and Adnett 2010: 13-14). The share of the gubernatorial vote won by the incumbent party or coalition is measured in 1991, 1995, 1999, and 2003 
in the analyses predicting spending; in 1987, 1999, and 2003 in the analyses predicting birth circumstances; and in 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, and 2003 in the analyses predicting 
infant mortality (the lagged dependent variable in the GMM model requires the exclusion of observations for 1987). In the GMM analysis the share of the gubernatorial vote won 
by the incumbent party or coalition is treated as an endogenous variable. Gervasoni (2010b) provided no data for the Federal Capital or for Tierra del Fuego.  
              54 
Table 15: Share of Deputy Vote Won By Incumbent Party and Health Outcomes 
 
   15-1  15-2   15-3  15-4  15-5 




in 1993, 1997, 
2001, and 2004 
Share of births at 
home, ln (INDEC 
2009) in 1990, 
2000, and 2004 
Share of births not 
attended by 
trained personnel, 
ln (INDEC 2009) 
in 1990, 2000, 
2004 
Infant mortality, ln 
(Argentina. 
Ministerio de 
Salud 2007) in 
1989, 1993, 1997, 
2001, and 2005 
Infant mortality, ln 
(Argentina. 
Ministerio de 
Salud 2007) in 
1989, 1993, 1997, 
2001, and 2005 
Maximum number of years observed  4  3  3  5  4 
Average number of years observed  3.7      2.8      2.8  4.6  3.9 
Nº Provinces  22  22  22  22  22 
Nº Observations  81  61  61  102  94 
Method  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  Two-Step Sys  
GMM 
Infant mortality rate lagged one period (four years)          1.198**            
(3.31) 
Gross provincial product per capita, ln (Mirabella and 
Nanni 2006) 
.028                
(1.29) 
-2.231***             
(4.24) 
-1.423              
(1.13) 
-.766             
(0.30) 
.398              
(1.08) 
Share of provincial Chamber of Deputies vote won by the 
incumbent party or coalition (Gervasoni 2010b) 
-.0002              
(0.84) 
-.019              
(2.87)* 
-.008              
(0.89) 
-.023              
(0.62) 
-.005              
(0.71) 
R-squared "within" (fixed effects are used)  .1516  .7977  .5959  .8393   
P > F  .5734  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000 
Lag limits          (3 .) 
Instrument set collapsed?          Yes 
Nº Instruments          12 
AR(1) (P > z)          .016 
AR(2) (P > z)          .506 
Hansen test (P > X
2)          .543 
Diff-in-Hansen (GMM, Diff.) (P > X
2)          .282 
Sargan test (P > X
2)          .660 
 
Top row in each cell: unstandardized regression coefficient. Bottom row (in parentheses): absolute value of t-statistic. Significance: †10%; *5%; **1%; ***0.1%. All two-tailed. 
All models include a constant (not shown) and time dummies (not shown). In the fixed effects models, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used. In the two-step GMM 
model, Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors are used (Roodman 2006: 9-11). Lag limits in the GMM model are chosen to come as close as possible to generating 
significant AR(1) P-values, insignificant AR(2) p-values, and Sargan and Hansen statistics whose P-values are greater than .25 but do not approach 1.00 (Roodman 2008: 11, 18; 
Petreski 2009: 16; Efendic, Pugh, and Adnett 2010: 13-14). The share of the provincial Chamber of Deputies vote won by the incumbent party or coalition is measured in 1991, 
1995, 1999, and 2003 in the analyses predicting spending; in 1987, 1999, and 2003 in the analyses predicting birth circumstances; and in 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, and 2003 in the 
analyses predicting infant mortality (the lagged dependent variable in the GMM model requires the exclusion of observations for 1987). In the GMM analysis the share of the vote 
won by the incumbent party or coalition is treated as an endogenous variable. Gervasoni (2010b) provided no data for the Federal Capital or for Tierra del Fuego.  
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Table 16: Share of Deputy Seats Won By Incumbent Party and Health Outcomes 
 
   16-1  16-2   16-3  16-4  16-5 




in 1993, 1997, 
2001, and 2004 
Share of births at 
home, ln (INDEC 
2009) in 1990, 
2000, and 2004 
Share of births not 
attended by 
trained personnel, 
ln (INDEC 2009) 
in 1990, 2000, 
2004 
Infant mortality, ln 
(Argentina. 
Ministerio de 
Salud 2007) in 
1989, 1993, 1997, 
2001, and 2005 
Infant mortality, ln 
(Argentina. 
Ministerio de 
Salud 2007) in 
1989, 1993, 1997, 
2001, and 2005 
Maximum number of years observed  4  3  3  5  4 
Average number of years observed  3.7      2.8      2.8  4.6  3.9 
Nº Provinces  22  22  22  22  22 
Nº Observations  81  61  61  102  94 
Method  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  Two-Step Sys  
GMM 
Infant mortality rate lagged one period (four years)          1.100***            
(4.05) 
Gross provincial product per capita, ln (Mirabella and 
Nanni 2006) 
.028                
(1.29) 
-2.231***             
(4.24) 
-1.423              
(1.13) 
-.766             
(0.30) 
.078              
(0.14) 
Share of provincial Chamber of Deputies seats won by the 
incumbent party or coalition (Gervasoni 2010b) 
-.0002              
(0.84) 
-.019              
(2.87)* 
-.008              
(0.89) 
-.023              
(0.62) 
.569              
(1.01) 
R-squared "within" (fixed effects are used)  .1516  .7977  .5959  .8393   
P > F  .5734  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000 
Lag limits          (3 3) 
Instrument set collapsed?          No 
Nº Instruments          14 
AR(1) (P > z)          .032 
AR(2) (P > z)          .432 
Hansen test (P > X
2)          .652 
Diff-in-Hansen (GMM, Diff.) (P > X
2)          .297 
Sargan test (P > X
2)          .454 
 
Top row in each cell: unstandardized regression coefficient. Bottom row (in parentheses): absolute value of t-statistic. Significance: †10%; *5%; **1%; ***0.1%. All two-tailed. 
All models include a constant (not shown) and time dummies (not shown). In the fixed effects models, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used. In the two-step GMM 
model, Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors are used (Roodman 2006: 9-11). Lag limits in the GMM model are chosen to come as close as possible to generating 
significant AR(1) P-values, insignificant AR(2) p-values, and Sargan and Hansen statistics whose P-values are greater than .25 but do not approach 1.00 (Roodman 2008: 11, 18; 
Petreski 2009: 16; Efendic, Pugh, and Adnett 2010: 13-14). The share of the provincial Chamber of Deputies seats won by the incumbent party or coalition is measured in 1991, 
1995, 1999, and 2003 in the analyses predicting spending; in 1987, 1999, and 2003 in the analyses predicting birth circumstances; and in 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, and 2003 in the 
analyses predicting infant mortality (the lagged dependent variable in the GMM model requires the exclusion of observations for 1987). In the GMM analysis the share of seats 
won by the incumbent party or coalition is treated as an endogenous variable. Gervasoni (2010b) provided no data for the Federal Capital or for Tierra del Fuego. The results are 
robust to the exclusion of La Rioja, which scores unusually high on the share of provincial Chamber of Deputies seats won by the incumbent party or coalition.  
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Table 17: Peronist Plurality in Provincial Chamber of Deputies and Health Outcomes 
   17-1  17-2   17-3  17-4  17-5 
Dependent variable  Health share of 
provincial 
spending (CONES 
2009), every 2 
years 1991-2004 
Share of births 
at home, ln 
(INDEC 2009) 
in 1990, 2000, 
and 2004 
Share of births 
not attended by 
trained personnel, 
ln (INDEC 2009) 












every 2 years 
1983-2004 
Maximum number of years observed  7  3  3  9  9 
Average number of years observed  7.0  2.8  2.7  9.0  8.9 
Nº Provinces  24  24  24  24  24 
Nº Observations  167  66  64  215  214 
Method  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  Two-Step Sys  
GMM 
Infant mortality rate lagged one period (two 
years) 
        1.074*         
(2.44) 
Gross provincial product per capita, ln 
(Mirabella and Nanni 2006), 1983-2004 
.035*              
(2.15) 
-2.671*             
(2.05) 
-.899                
(0.92) 
.066              
(0.58) 
.664              
(1.13) 
Peronists win the most votes in provincial 
deputy elections (Tow 2010), 1983-2003 
-.002               
(0.77) 
.585         
(1.04) 
-.736            
(1.53) 
.022             
(0.69) 
-.069            
(0.52) 
R-sq (R-sq within for FE)  .1836  .4681  .4485  .8039   
P > F  .0067  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000 
Lag limits          (5 4) 
Instrument set collapsed?          Yes 
Nº Instruments          18 
AR(1) (P > z)          .030 
AR(2) (P > z)          .711 
Hansen test (P > X
2)          .696 
Diff-in-Hansen (GMM, Diff.) (P > X
2)          .843 
Sargan test (P > X
2)          .319 
 
Top row in each cell: unstandardized regression coefficient. Bottom row (in parentheses): absolute value of t-statistic. Significance: †10%; *5%; **1%; ***0.1%. All two-tailed. 
All models include a constant (not shown) and time dummies (not shown). In the fixed effects models, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used. In the two-step GMM 
model, Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors are used (Roodman 2006: 9-11). Lag limits in the GMM model are chosen to come as close as possible to generating 
significant AR(1) P-values, insignificant AR(2) p-values, and Sargan and Hansen statistics whose P-values are greater than .25 but do not approach 1.00 (Roodman 2008: 11, 18; 
Petreski 2009: 16; Efendic, Pugh, and Adnett 2010: 13-14). "Peronists win the most votes" is a 0-1 dummy variable. In the analyses predicting spending and infant mortality, each 
observation is whether the Peronists or a Peronist-dominated coalition won the most votes (0 = no, 1=yes) in the two elections prior to the year in which the dependent variable is 
measured (the value is the mean of the two elections; it can be 0.0, 0.5, or 1.0). In the analyses predicting spending and infant mortality, the dummy variable for Peronists winning 
the most votes is averaged over the two elections prior to the year in which the dependent variable is measured (i.e., 2 and 4 years prior). In the analyses predicting the proportion 
of mothers giving birth in the indicated circumstances in 1990, 2000, or 2004, vote share for the most voted party or coalition is averaged as follows: across the elections of 1983, 
1985, 1987, and 1989 for 1990; across the elections of 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, and 1999 for 2000; and across the elections of 2001 and 2003 for 2004.  
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Table 18: Provincial Chamber of Deputies Seats Held By Women and Health Outcomes 
 
    18-1  18-2  18-3  18-4 




2009) in 1993, 
2001, and 
2004 
Share of births 
at home, ln 
(INDEC 2009) 
in 1990, 2000, 
and 2004 
Share of births 










Salud 2007) in 
1993, 2001, 
and 2005 
  Maximum number of periods observed  3  3  3  3 
  Average number of periods observed  2.9  2.8  2.8  2.9 
  Nº Provinces  24  24  24  24 
  Nº Observations  70  68  66  70 
  Method  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  TSCS FE 
  Gross provincial product per capita, ln (Mirabella 









  Provincial deputy seats held by women in 1991, 









  R-squared (within)  .1174  .7680  .6455  .8609 
  p > F  .5049  .0000  .0000  .0000 
 
Top row in each cell: unstandardized regression coefficient. Bottom row (in parentheses): absolute value of t-statistic. Significance: †10%; *5%; **1%; ***0.1%. All two-tailed. 
All models include a constant and time dummies (not shown). All models use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
  
              58 
Table 19: Gender Quota for Provincial Chamber of Deputies and Health Outcomes 
 
   19-1   19-2   19-3  19-4   19-5   19-6   19-7  19-8 






















































next 5 years 
Average number of years observed  12.0  12.0  12.0  12.0  12.0  9.0  12.0  8.0 
Nº Provinces  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24 
Nº Observations  288  288  288  288  288  216  288  192 
Method  Pooled OLS  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  Pooled OLS  TSCS FE  TSCS FE  Two-Step 
Sys  GMM 
Two-Step 
Sys  GMM 
lagged dependent variable              .592**       
(2.90) 
.962***     
(14.34) 
Gross provincial product (GPP) per capita, ln 
(Mirabella and Nanni 2006), 2 years hence 
.080***  
(6.26) 
.036†              
(1.73) 
  -.581*** 
(15.90) 
-.041      
(0.29) 
  -.179      
(1.36) 
 
GPP per capita, ln (Mirabella and Nanni 
2006), mean over next five years 
    .048*              
(2.21) 
    -.080      
(0.42) 
  .126        
(0.80) 
Gender quota (0 in years before introduced, 1 
in years when/after introduced), 1991-2004 
-.017***        
(3.94) 
-.004      
(1.28) 
-.001      
(0.38) 




-.039**   
(3.16) 
-.001      
(0.05) 
.002        
(0.11) 
R-sq (R-sq within for FE)  .4119  .1485  .2420  .5224  .6318  .6826     
P > F  .0000  .0035  .0013  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000 
Lag limits              (3 2)  (3 3) 
Instrument set collapsed?              Yes  Yes 
Nº Instruments              21  13 
AR(1) (P > z)              .012  .003 
AR(2) (P > z)              .510  .116 
Hansen test (P > X
2)              .375  .463 
Diff-in-Hansen (GMM, Diff.) (P > X
2)              .385  .463 
Sargan test (P > X
2)              .130  .250 
 
Top row in each cell: unstandardized regression coefficient. Bottom row (in parentheses): absolute value of t-statistic. Significance: †10%; *5%; **1%; ***0.1%. All two-tailed. 
All models include a constant (not shown) and time dummies (not shown) for 1991-2004 inclusive. In the OLS and fixed effects models, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
are used. In the two-step GMM models, Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors are used (Roodman 2006: 9-11). Lag limits in GMM models are chosen to come as 
close as possible to generating significant AR(1) P-values, insignificant AR(2) p-values, and Sargan and Hansen statistics whose P-values are greater than .25 but do not approach 
1.00 (Roodman 2008: 11, 18; Petreski 2009: 16; Efendic, Pugh, and Adnett 2010: 13-14). Results are robust to lagging the gender quota 1, 3, 4, and 5 years (the results shown 
above lag the introduction of the gender quota 2 years in Models 19-1, 19-3, 19-5, and 19-7 and 0 years in the other models), alternative lag limits in the GMM models, and 
treating the introduction of the gender quota as an endogenous variable (the results in Models 19-7 and 19-8 treat the introduction of the gender quota as an exogenous variable).  
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Appendix 1: Cross-National Quantitative Studies of Political Factors and Health Outcomes 
 
 




Units of Analysis 
Altman and 
Castiglioni 2009 
Infant survival, life 
expectancy 
GDP per capita  Democracy (0/1) +S; 
Polity score +S; voter 
turnout 0,NS 
TSCS FE  18 Latin American 
countries x 30 years 
1972-2001, n=265-
305 
Avelino, Brown, and 
Hunter 2005 
Public health 




infl, trade open, cap 
mobil 
Democracy (0/1) 
+,NS; degree of 
democracy (Polity) 
"did not affect 
finding" 
TSCS Lagged DV, 
TSCS RE 
19 Latin American 




Infant survival, life 
expectancy, water, 
sanit, illit, immuniz. 





years of schooling, 
legal origin, year, 
region 
Polity IV. Long term 
democratic experience 
+S on infant survival, 
life exp, water, sanit, 
illit, immuniz. 










GDP per capita 
growth, mean years 




Cross-sectional  67 countries circa 
1972 
Blaydes and Kayser 
2007 
Change in calorie 
availabiliy, Change 
in calorie availability 
from animal products 
GDP/cap, GDP 
growth 
Polity IV score -,NS; 
Polity IV interacted 
with growth +,S 
TSCS FE, RE  All countries with 
GDP/cap below 
$10,000 1961-2003; 
3372 observations  
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Units of Analysis 




normal birth weight 
GDP/cap, Gini, 
social security 
spending as % GDP, 
% pop covered by 
medical insurance 
Voter turnout -,S, % 
left vote +,S; relations 
to survival (but not 
lbw)  disappeared 
when Gini controlled 
for 
TSCS RE  19 OECD 1960-
1994; 653 (w/o Gini) 
or 61 (w/Gini) 
observations 
Franco, Álvarez-







spending as % GDP 
Trichotomized 
democracy indicator 




140-162 countries in 
1998 





poptot, popdens, aid, 
TVs, state failure 
Polity IV score -S 
(except in low income, 
+S); Institutional 
quality +S 





and Alfaro 2007 






Democratic history +S 




and Moreno 2005 




British legal orig, 
latitude, ethnic 
fractlz, poptot, 
airdist, oil, diamonds, 
Protestant 
Democratic stock +S, 
Centripetalism 
(parliamentary system, 
PR electoral system, 
weak federalism) +S 
TSCS RE  125-127 countries, 
n=2,633-2,663  
Ghobarah, Huth, and 
Russett 2004 
Public health 
spending as % GDP 
GDPcap, income ≠, 
mean yrs school, 
ethnic hetero., 
enduring int'l rivalry 
Polity IV score +,S.  Cross-sectional c. 
2000 
Spending: 179 
countries observed in 
2000  
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Units of Analysis 
Kaufman and Segura-
Ubiergo 2001 
Annual change in 
public health and 
education spending 
(a) per capita, (b) as 
% GDP, and © as % 
of total public 
spending 
GDPcap, popage, 
business cycle, exch 




based governments -S 




Kaza 2003  Infant survival, % 
decline since 
previous data point 
State domestic 
product per capita, 
average annual % 
rise since previous 
data point 
% female state 
legislators +,S; % 
female voters -,NS 
(+,NS GLS); voter 
turnout +,NS; 
electoral competition 
+,NS (0,NS GLS) 
TSCS FE, GLS  16 Indian states every 
fifth year 1970-2000, 
n= about 112 
Klomp and de Haan 
2009 
A 19-indicator factor 
of population health 
status and a 10-










15-indicator factor of 
democracy +,S on 
health status and +,NS 
on health resources. 
Regime instability -,S 
on health status and -




indep var averages 
for 1980-1999; dep 
var measured in 
2000-05. 




several educ indic, 
pop per doctor safe 
water 
GDPcap, land area, 
population, 
urbanization, OECD 
Polity III democracy 
+S except for some 
immunization & pop 
per doctor findings; 
robust to substitution 









TSCS: every 5th year 
1967-1992, n=382  
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Units of Analysis 
McGuire 2010  Infant survival, 
public health care 
spending as a % 
GDP, utilization of 
basic social services 
(trained attendance at 
birth, child immuniz., 
female education, 
access to safe water, 
access to adequate 
sanitation) 
GDP per capita, Gini 








share age 65+ when 
predicting health sh. 
of public spending) 
Polity IV. Long term 
democ.: +,S on infant 
survival; +,S on most 
social services; +,NS 
on health share of 
public spending. Short 
term democ.: +,NS on 
infant survival; +,NS 
on most social 
services; +,NS on 





countries in 1990; 
n=100 










Passage of female 
suffrage law +,S 
TSCS FE  50 states annually 
1900-1936 
Moon 1991  Physical Quality of 
Life Index (index of 
infant mortality, life 
expectancy at age 1, 
literacy) 
% labor in agric, govt 
spending, interaction 
terms, either democ 
or ideol orient of 
govt c. 1970 
Democ (Bollen avg. 
60&65) +,S; Leftist 
govt (Blondel) 0; 
Rightist govt +,S iff. 
govt spending is low 
Cross-sectional c. 
1970 
120 countries circa 
1970. 
Przeworski et al. 
2000 
Infant survival, life 
expectancy 








Up to 141 countries 
observed annually 
1950-1990, n=1,417 
(IMR), 916 (LE)  
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Units of Analysis 
Ross 2006  Infant survival  GDPcap, GDP 
growth, population 
density, AIDS. No 
controls for factors 
"that may reflect 
government 
intervention." Others 





IV), both +,NS 
TSCS FE and RE  168 countries 
observed annually 
1970-2000; multiple 
imputation used to 
fill in missing values 
Rudra and Haggard 
2005 
Infant survival, level 
of health care 
spending as a % of 
total govt spending 
Trade, capital flows, 
debt, dependency, 
growth, potential 
labor power, GDPcap 
Democracy (Polity), 
+,S on both outcomes 
TSCS FE  57 developing 
countries annually (?) 
from 1972 to 1997 
(n=793 for infant 





Infant survival in 
1997 
IMR 1980, GDPcap, 
enroll, pub h sp 
%GDP, commod 
concentr, MNC 
penet, IMF condit 
Democracy (Bollen) 
in 1980, +,NS, but 
democracy attenuates 
the detrimental effect 






nations; DV 1997, 
Ivs 1975-1980 
Vollmer and Ziegler 
2009 
Life expectancy  GDPcap, income 
ineq, literacy, ethnic 
fract., war, AIDS 
Democracy (Polity, 
averaged over 
previous five years) 
+,S 
TSCS FE  100-143 countries 





Infant survival, life 
expectancy, gross 
primary enrollment 
(all 1986), HDI 
(1990) 
GDPcap, pop growth, 
disarticulation, 
dummy for planned 
economies 
Democracy (Bollen) 
in 1965 +,S  Also 
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Units of Analysis 
Zweifel and Navia 
2000 
Infant survival  Fertility, population, 












Zweifel and Navia 
2003 
Infant survival  Fertility, population, 
% females in EAP, 













Missing data on 
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